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Probabilistic Compliance 
Alex Raskolnikov† 
Uncertain legal standards are pervasive but understudied. The key 
theoretical result showing an ambiguous relationship between legal uncertainty 
and optimal deterrence remains largely undeveloped, and no alternative 
conceptual approaches to the economic analysis of legal uncertainty have 
emerged. This Article offers such an alternative by shifting from the well-
established and familiar optimal deterrence theory to the new and unfamiliar 
probabilistic compliance framework. This shift brings the analysis closer to the 
world of legal practice and yields new theoretical insights. Most importantly, 
lower uncertainty tends to lead to more compliant positions and greater private 
gains. In contrast, the market for legal advice tends to reduce compliance over 
time—a trend that a regulator may counter either by clarifying the law or by 
reiterating the law’s continuing ambiguity. If detection is uncertain, the 
probabilistic compliance framework reveals why, contrary to the prevailing 
view, the standard damages multiplier should be used to counter detection 
uncertainty but not legal uncertainty. The Article also reconciles economists’ 
and lawyers’ understanding of probabilities, highlights the challenges of 
modeling risk-bearing costs resulting from uncertain legal commands, and 
provides theoretical support for gain-based sanctions beyond the limited 
settings where the complete deterrence theory has justified their use thus far. 
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Introduction 
Economic analysis of legal uncertainty has seen little progress in three 
decades. The breakthrough contributions in the 1980s1 produced interesting but 
ambiguous results while relying on strong assumptions.2 In the following years, 
scholars have had little success in relaxing the assumptions or in resolving, 
limiting, or otherwise illuminating the ambiguity. 3  Not surprisingly, legal 
uncertainty has faded into the background of law and economics scholarship. 
In sharp contrast, it has remained of great importance in the world of legal 
practice. Disagreements about the appropriate level of the law’s certainty are 
pervasive. They embroil courts and administrative agencies, domestic and 
international actors. And they have major policy implications. 
Examples are easy to find. The United States, for instance, is the only 
developed nation resisting the adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
prefers the more certain Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to 
the less certain IFRS.4 Regulation of financial derivatives, to take another 
example, continues to suffer because one principal regulator, the SEC, prefers a 
 
1. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 93-97 (1987); 
John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 
70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). 
2. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 17-23. 
3. A rare exception is Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Errors and the Functioning of Tort 
Liability, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 165 (2005). His findings are discussed below. See infra note 21. 
4 . See Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The 
Dynamics of Resistance Against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89, 105 (2014). 
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more certain, rules-based approach while another one, the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), favors a less certain, principles-based 
strategy.5 The United States Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit cannot agree on how certain the patent law should be. The 
highest court insists on vague formulations while the specialized circuit court 
prefers clear rules.6 
Even the tax law—the domain often perceived as dominated by bright-line 
rules—is infused with tension resulting from legal uncertainty. For instance, it 
took the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Treasury Department ten years 
and three tries to interpret a key uncertain term related to controversial 
corporate inversion transactions.7  These involve U.S. corporations moving 
offshore, often to reduce their U.S. tax bills. Congress enacted a punitive tax 
regime for inverting companies, but withheld its wrath if the inverter has 
“substantial business activities” in its new corporate home.8 The regulators first 
interpreted the term “substantial” with a multi-factor test stapled to a safe 
harbor and illustrated by clarifying examples.9 They then moved to a multi-
factor test with no explanations of any kind.10 Finally, they abandoned the 
multi-factor test altogether in favor of a clear rule.11 This story is hardly 
unique.12 
Legal uncertainty is not only pervasive, it is persistent. Numerous 
uncertain terms remain undefined for years, even decades. 13  Legislators, 
administrative agencies, and courts infuse the law with new vague standards all 
 
5. See Frank D’Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: 
Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 500-01 (2010); 
Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, 
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 50 (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf. 
6. See David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of 
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L REV. 647, 664, 668-77 (2013). 
7. Congress added section 7874, containing the uncertain term in question, in 2004. 
See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801, 118 Stat. 1418, 1562-66 (2004). 
The final regulations interpreting this term were issued in 2015. See T.D. 9720, 2015-25 I.R.B. 1070. 
8. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). 
9. For a summary, see Joseph A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and 
“Substantial Business Activities,” 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 378-79 (2013). 
10. See id. at 379-81. 
11. See id. at 384-85; Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3(b) (interpreting the “substantial business 
activities” test to mean 25% of the employees, employee compensation, assets, and income of the 
consolidated group of companies). 
12. For a similarly tortured history of the Treasury regulations interpreting the term 
“substantially similar” in I.R.C. § 871(m), see David S. Miller & Jason Schwartz, New 871(m) 
Regulations Finalize Dividend-Equivalent Payment Withholding Rules for Equity Derivatives, 13 J. 
TAX’N FIN. PROD. 15, 15-18 (2016). 
13. For example, an IRS official admitted in 2011 that uncertainty surrounding the 
term “securities” used in corporate reorganization provisions has persistent “since long before I was 
born.” Amy S. Elliott, Proposed Deemed Asset Sale Regs May Get Rewrite, Alexander Says, 131 TAX 
NOTES 561, 562 (2011). In the same breath, the official revealed that he had no plans to resolve the 
uncertainty. See id. 
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the time.14 Multi-billion dollar deals go forward or fall apart based on lawyers’ 
varying interpretations of legally uncertain provisions. 15  Whether this 
uncertainty results from incomplete information, insufficient resources, 
incompetence, or some other reason,16 legal uncertainty is a fact of life. So, it is 
important to understand its consequences. 
Does greater legal certainty benefit regulators or frustrate their goals? Are 
individuals and firms likely to gain from greater certainty or be harmed by it? 
What are the effects of the market for legal advice—the market that is of great 
importance for the most significant economic actors? What is the interaction 
between legal uncertainty and detection uncertainty? The law and economics 
literature has little to offer in answering these questions. This Article addresses 
all of them. 
Our poor understanding of the consequences of uncertain laws may appear 
surprising. Legal uncertainty is a basic concept familiar to any law student, not 
to mention lawyers and judges. Any time the law uses terms like “reasonable,” 
“substantial,” “significant,” “material,” or “due”—any time, that is, the law 
relies on a standard rather than a rule—a rational actor taking a legally 
uncertain position faces a seemingly straightforward tradeoff. The actor stands 
to derive a benefit if his position is deemed compliant with the law. No bright 
line separates compliance from noncompliance. The actor may change his 
behavior—adjust his position—along a certain dimension to increase the 
likelihood of compliance, but this adjustment is costly. The actor chooses his 
position by maximizing benefits net of costs. How does legal uncertainty affect 
the actor’s choice? 
Legal Uncertainty in the Optimal Deterrence Framework 
The path-breaking work analyzing this problem came three decades ago 
from John Calfee and Richard Craswell (C&C) and, independently, from 
Steven Shavell. Both C&C and Shavell evaluate the actor’s response to 
uncertain legal commands by comparing it to a particular reference point. For 
 
14. For instance, section 871(m), added to the Internal Revenue Code in 2010,  
provides that some payments will be treated as “dividend equivalents” (and subject to a highly 
disadvantageous tax treatment) if they are “substantially similar” to payments described in the statute. 
Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). See also T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 
811 (2015) (holding that a city denying a siting application must provide written reasons for the denial 
“essentially contemporaneously” without specifying what time period satisfies this standard); Rev. Proc. 
2015-43, 2015-40 I.R.B. 467 (ruling that the size of “active business” matters for the purposes of 
satisfying the spinoff provisions, but not specifying what size is acceptable). 
15. See Williams Corp., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 2016 WL 3576682 (Del. 
Ch. June 24, 2016) (concluding that Latham & Watkins’s refusal to deliver a “should” tax opinion was 
reasonable and allowing Energy Transfer Equity L.P. to withdraw from its proposed $33 billion merger 
with the Williams Companies); Alison Sider & Austen Hufford, Williams Files Appeal To Close Energy 
Transfer Merger, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2016) (referring to the original value of the deal as $33 billion), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/williams-shareholders-opt-for-ete-deal-1467036532. 
16. Answering the important question about the causes and persistence of legal 
uncertainty is not this Article’s objective. 
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C&C, this point is the socially optimal level of behavior; for Shavell, it is an 
exogenous level of care (which is determined with the goal of maximizing 
welfare or, under some assumptions, efficiency).17 These reference points are 
crucial to the analysis. If behavior falls short of the optimal level—say drivers 
exceed the efficiency-maximizing speed—uncertainty results in costly under-
deterrence. If behavior surpasses the optimum, the problem is over-deterrence. 
Either way, the inquiry aims to understand how varying the vagueness of a 
speed limit changes the efficiency of the drivers’ behavior. 
This optimal deterrence framework is fruitful if we may plausibly estimate 
the optimal level of behavior. Perhaps we may do so when it comes to 
speeding. 18  But what about the “substantial business activities” test for 
corporate inversions? Here, we encounter a very challenging problem. Not only 
is there no theory of optimal corporate reorganizations, there is no theory of 
optimal corporate tax. Even the theory of optimal capital income taxation (with 
corporate tax being one form of it) is not well developed.19 So we have no way 
of deciding what level of business activity in the inverter’s new home country 
is optimal if the goal is to maximize efficiency or welfare. The optimal 
deterrence theory sheds little light on how best to interpret—or enforce—the 
“substantial business activities” test or many similar vague thresholds found 
throughout the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, tax is not unique. Many 
(most?) other real-life regulatory regimes do not come close to efficiency 
maximization.20 In all those regimes, the optimal deterrence theory has very 
limited applications. 
The gap between the optimal laws and the real ones limits the policy 
relevance of C&C’s and Shavell’s foundational results. C&C’s key conclusion 
that legal uncertainty creates conflicting incentives for over- and under-
 
17. See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 97. While Shavell’s discussion of legal uncertainty 
does not focus on whether this exogenous level is socially optimal, most of the rest of the book does 
precisely that. See id. at 7. Thus, his analysis of legal uncertainty adopts the optimal deterrence 
framework implicitly. Efficiency maximization does not take distributional consequences into account, 
while welfare maximization does. If one accepts the argument, or simply assumes, that all distributional 
issues should be addressed by the tax-and-transfer system, one would conclude that legal rules should be 
designed without accounting for distributional consequences. In that case, efficiency-maximizing legal 
rules will be welfare-maximizing as well. See, e.g., David Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-
Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Reform, 7 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 151, 151-52 
(2015). 
18 . One may imagine that a negligence standard at least roughly maximizes 
efficiency, or perhaps one could have imagined this in the early days of law and economics. Richard 
Craswell’s more recent views about the social optimality of law are much more ambivalent. See Richard 
Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 903, 911 (2003). 
19. For an extended discussion, see Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax 
Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 560-66 (2013). 
20. For an argument that the common law is unlikely to produce efficiency-
maximizing rules, see Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 
330 (2010). For an expression of similar skepticism about contract law, see Eric A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003); 
Craswell, supra note 18. 
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deterrence relative to the social optimum is not helpful if we do not know 
where the social optimum lies. Their conclusion that uncertainty leads to 
ambiguous predictions of behavior—with actors both exceeding and falling 
short of the social optimum—is uninformative for the same reason. Shavell’s 
similar conclusion with respect to the level of due care is likewise unhelpful if 
we have no idea what that level is. Thus, not only are the key results reached by 
C&C and Shavell ambiguous, they are difficult to interpret without the social 
optimality assumption or the exogenously given level of behavior.21 
Legal Uncertainty in the Probabilistic Compliance Framework 
This Article offers a new take on legal uncertainty by focusing on 
compliance rather than deterrence. Scholars working in the optimal deterrence 
tradition use the terms deterrence and compliance interchangeably.22  This 
Article draws a sharp distinction between the two. It uses the term deterrence to 
refer to the goal of assuring that an agent’s behavior maximizes social 
welfare.23 In contrast, it uses the term compliance as a legal rather than 
economic concept. By compliance, this Article simply means compliance with 
the law, without making any assumptions about the law’s welfare 
characteristics. When the law is uncertain, greater compliance means a higher 
likelihood that one’s position will be viewed as lawful by the relevant 
authority—a higher probability of success. Compliance with uncertain law, 
therefore, is necessarily probabilistic. 
This change in focus offers greater clarity as a positive matter but greater 
ambiguity as a normative one. On the descriptive side, the Article’s first 
notable result is that the famous ambiguity in the relationship between legal 
uncertainty and optimal deterrence discovered by C&C and Shavell largely 
disappears when we focus on the interaction between uncertainty and 
compliance. While greater certainty may lead to either over- or under-
deterrence, it generally leads to greater compliance. This conclusion follows 
from the simulations based on this Article’s model. It also follows from C&C’s 
original simulations that I replicate. And it holds if a normal distribution 
(generally used in C&C’s and this Article’s simulations) is replaced by several 
other plausible probability distributions. To be sure, simulations do not amount 
 
21. Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 3, extends C&C’s analysis but finds the same or even 
greater indeterminacy in the relationship between uncertainty and deterrence. A few extensions that 
eliminate this indeterminacy (Dari-Mattiacci’s Propositions 12 and 15) model situations that lack the 
key feature of the regulatory model offered here and the tort model mostly focused on by Craswell & 
Calfee—the discontinuous jump in actor’s payoff upon a finding of liability. See id. at 179-83. 
22. Consider, for example, the titles of the two C&C articles on legal uncertainty. See 
Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1; Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1. 
23. This is a standard use of the term “optimal deterrence.”  See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, 
Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 742 (2012). 
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to a rigorous proof.24 But the conclusion that greater certainty leads to greater 
compliance is robust. 
This conclusion is reinforced when one considers the likely effects of the 
market for legal advice. The Article suggests two effects. First, as lawyers 
grapple with each new uncertain legal test, they often converge to a common 
interpretation even when the government issues no guidance. In this model’s 
terms, this convergence means a decrease in the perceived uncertainty while the 
actual uncertainty (the content of the legal standard) remains unchanged. 
Second, clients pressure their counsel to condone progressively lower 
compliance efforts as sufficient to fulfill an uncertain legal command. This 
pressure is entirely rational: lower compliance efforts are less costly. But it 
leads to a one-way ratchet in the absence of government intervention: lawyers 
interpret uncertain standards as being increasingly forgiving. Both effects yield 
the same result. Over time, clients take increasingly aggressive, less plausible, 
less likely to succeed positions. 
Another result is that greater certainty typically leads to larger private 
gains. This would not surprise anyone familiar with the unrelenting efforts by 
sophisticated firms (that may be plausibly assumed to be risk-neutral25) to 
induce regulators to clarify uncertain standards. The model also predicts that 
when rational actors take uncertain legal positions that are observed by the 
regulator, their positions are very likely to have more than a fifty-fifty chance 
of success. This, too, would not surprise legal practitioners involved in the 
opinion practice in connection with public deals. 
A further descriptive contribution made here is to reconcile a lawyer’s 
understanding of uncertainty with that of an economist. The two have different 
origins and result from different mental processes, but they produce the same 
relationship between the probability of success and the actor’s effort to comply 
with the law. Thus, the widespread use of the language of probability theory by 
legal advisors is not only sensible, but is consistent with the economic models 
relying on that theory to investigate legal uncertainty. 
Implications of the Probabilistic Compliance Framework 
What should we make of these results? This is when the departure from 
the optimal deterrence framework becomes an issue. The welfare maximization 
objective may be unrealistically ambitious, but it is clear, rigorous, and has a 
significant normative appeal. Without it, how should we evaluate the effects of 
legal uncertainty just described? 
 
24. Shavell’s results are based on comparative statics rather than simulations, but his 
approach has other limitations. See infra text accompanying note 119. 
25 . These are multi-national corporations. See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, 
Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 123 (2004) (“The 
corporation is normally assumed to be risk-neutral because shareholders can diversify their investment 
in the corporation . . . .”). 
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One possibility is to posit that law should facilitate compliance. 
Unfortunately, compliance is a fuzzy objective if law is uncertain. The problem 
is not that compliance has no clear economic interpretation—the degree of 
compliance is simply the probability of success. The fuzziness comes from 
specifying what this probability ought to be. Without insisting on any particular 
answer, this Article makes four observations. 
First, regulators of all stripes generally prefer positions that are more 
likely to be legal to those less likely to be so.26 Second, while law enforcers 
want more compliance, they do not ask for certain compliance—they accept 
probabilistic compliance without demanding perfection. 27  Third, the law 
sometimes expressly conditions a favorable outcome on the probability of 
success exceeding 50%.28 And fourth, scholars have argued that compliance 
with uncertain standards should be understood as behavior that is more likely to 
be legal than illegal.29 If one finds these arguments appealing, one would be 
interested in this Article’s insights about the effect of legal uncertainty on 
compliance. 
Another approach is to posit that, if we take the law as given and 
irreducibly uncertain, it makes sense to maximize private gains of the regulated 
parties, at least when their behavior is observed by enforcement authorities. If 
externalities and other market failures are unlikely, or if the social welfare 
effects of externalities are ambiguous,30 this may be a plausible evaluative 
criterion.31 
This Article does not defend either the compliance or the gain 
maximization as normatively appropriate. But for those who find compliance or 
private benefits to be appealing, or policy-relevant, or just intellectually 
interesting considerations, this Article’s takeaway is that greater legal certainty 
tends to increase both. 
Thus, whether it is the SEC defining the term “control” in terms of 
specific percentages or a vague standard,32 or the IRS making a similar decision 
about the term “substantial,”33 or the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) choosing whether to require companies to book a reserve when outlays 
 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 111-114. 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 148-149. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 115-117. 
29. See Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 111, 
154-55 (2009); Rachelle Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. LOU. L. REV. 185, 212 (2010). 
30. This will be the case if a regulated activity produces an externality (or something 
similar to it) but the regulation itself is welfare-reducing. For a discussion, see Raskolnikov, supra note 
19, at 574. 
31. For scholarship using this normative criterion, see infra text accompanying notes 
142-143. 
32. See, e.g., Gelter & Eroglu, supra note 4, at 116-19 (examining various degrees of 
specificity of defining “control”). 
33. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12. 
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are “probable” or to specify this term more precisely,34 or the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) considering jointly with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
whether to define relevant markets by referring to “effective competition” or by 
using numerical thresholds,35 the regulators should be aware that greater legal 
uncertainty is often detrimental both to private actors and to compliance with 
the law. 
Some evidence suggests that regulators misunderstand these 
relationships.36 At the same time, there are encouraging examples of regulators 
responding appropriately to the negative (from the compliance perspective) 
consequences of the market for legal advice.37 
The Article also illuminates the interaction between legal uncertainty and 
detection uncertainty. C&C investigate the use of the standard damages 
multiplier in the optimal deterrence setting, assuming that the multiplier is used 
to reverse both types of uncertainty.38 This Article explains that if policymakers 
are interested in compliance rather than deterrence, the multiplier should offset 
detection uncertainty alone. This conclusion is new to the literature, and it has a 
clear rationale. 
Using a multiplier to offset legal uncertainty in the optimal deterrence 
framework converts, in expectation, a threshold regime (such as negligence39) 
into a strict liability regime. As is well known, both may be welfare-
maximizing.40 Thus, there is no need to fine-tune the use of the multiplier to 
separate legal and detection uncertainty. In the compliance framework, 
however, using a multiplier to offset legal uncertainty converts an uncertain 
legal standard into an outright prohibition. That is because the stronger the 
position one takes, the greater one’s likelihood of success, the smaller the 
chance of liability, and the larger the multiplier. No rational policymaker would 
endorse this result because if the policymaker had preferred an outright 
prohibition, it would have enacted a clear rule in the first place. Thus, when the 
 
34. See Jennifer L. Blouin et al., Pre-Empting Disclosure? Firms’ Decisions Prior to 
FIN No. 48, 85 ACCT. REV. 791, 794 (2010) (explaining the switch from the general “probable” standard 
for booking tax reserves to the 50% threshold). 
35. See Richard J. Wegener et al., Nonprice Vertical Restraints Tying, Bundling, 
Rebates & Loyalty Discounts—Consumer Friendly or Exclusionary Conduct?, 56 ALI-CLE 41, 142-46 
(2012) (describing the “small but significant nontransitory increase in price” standard adopted by the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines as the “most analytically rigorous approach” to defining relevant 
markets). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 153-155. 
37. See infra text accompanying notes 173-177. 
38. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 292-93 (assuming that the standard 
multiplier is the inverse of the probability of punishment, which reflects both detection and legal 
uncertainty). 
39. For a suggestion that the term “threshold regime” is more appealing than “fault-
based” regime, see Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms, and 
the Fisc, 102 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1142 (2014). 
40. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public 
Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007). 
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law is not optimal, the multiplier should account for detection uncertainty 
alone. 
These are the Article’s main results. Along with additional findings, they 
are presented in three parts. Part I offers the basic model, locates it in the 
literature, reconciles the meaning of probability statements by lawyers and 
economists, and offers compliance (probability of success) as the evaluative 
criterion for studying uncertain standards that may not be plausibly assumed to 
maximize efficiency or welfare. Part II presents the main results regarding the 
relationship between uncertainty on the one hand and compliance and private 
gains on the other. It discusses the effects of the market for legal advice, the 
design of the damages multiplier, and the use of probabilistic compliance as a 
plausible regulatory objective. Part III briefly explores complications arising 
from multi-dimensional legal standards, variable benefit functions, and costs 
that change abruptly upon a slight shift in the actor’s position. It also identifies 
the unappreciated challenges of investigating the effects of legal uncertainty on 
risk-averse actors. Part IV explains why the Article’s findings extend the 
analysis of gain-based sanctions for violations of non-optimal laws beyond the 
narrow set of cases traditionally considered by theorists of complete (rather 
than optimal) deterrence. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. The Groundwork 
Uncertain legal commands are the stuff of everyday life. Lawmakers enact 
them, lawyers interpret them, and people make decisions guided by them.41 Yet 
there has been surprisingly little investigation of the basic questions related to 
legal uncertainty, at least in the law and economics literature. 
What do lawyers convey when they express various degrees of confidence 
in a given position? How do courts and lawmakers evaluate compliance with 
uncertain legal standards? What does it mean to “comply” with a vague legal 
command in the first place? This Part starts with a simple model and lays the 
groundwork for its analysis by offering answers to these and related questions. 
A. Motivating Examples 
To motivate the inquiry, consider a few simple vignettes. Imagine a major 
U.S. company wishing to sell one of its two businesses to a potential acquirer. 
If the sale can be structured as a tax-free transaction, the company will realize a 
benefit of $100 million. If, however, the sale is taxable, the tax liability will 
erase the benefit entirely, and the sale is not worth pursuing. Tax lawyers 
inform the company’s CEO that in order to qualify for the tax-free treatment, 
the company must transfer “substantially all” of its assets to the acquirer.42 
 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. 
42. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
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Moreover, the lawyers explain that the meaning of “substantially all” is 
uncertain. Transferring no assets clearly fails the test, while transferring all 
assets definitely satisfies it. For anything in between, the greater the percentage 
of the assets transferred, the more confident the lawyers are that the test is met. 
Unfortunately, transferring assets in excess of a certain amount is undesirable 
for the company, and the greater the excess, the less happy the company’s 
CEO. 
Similar scenarios may be constructed in almost any area of the law. 
Imagine a corporate board contemplating a potentially profitable transaction 
that is expected to raise the company value by $100 million. The board must 
decide how much independent advice it should obtain to protect the transaction 
from a challenge under the demanding—but vague—“entire fairness” test of 
the Delaware corporate law.43 There are plenty of friendly bankers standing 
ready to provide the “fairness opinions” that the board needs, but the bankers 
charge hefty fees for those opinions. The more opinions the board receives, the 
greater the cost to the company, but the greater the likelihood that the court will 
uphold the transaction against a future challenge. 
Or take an administrative agency considering a new regulation that is 
expected to produce, in the agency’s view, a $100 million benefit. The agency 
must decide how much of its limited resources to spend on the cost-benefit 
analysis in order to protect the regulation from being invalidated by a court.44 
The agency has no doubt that the new regulation will turn out to be beneficial 
no matter how much cost-benefit analysis the agency undertakes. But the 
analysis is expensive. On the other hand, the more the agency spends, the more 
thorough the analysis, and the greater the chance of a judicial approval. 
Even legislative decision-making can be modeled in the same way. 
Imagine Congress finalizing a piece of legislation expected to produce $100 
million of (what legislators view as) a surplus. The legislature must decide how 
much “due process” the legislation should provide to its beneficiaries in order 
to withstand a constitutional challenge. 45  Importantly, greater procedural 
protections (such as multiple hearings) do not change the surplus but impose a 
greater cost on the government. Greater protections also increase the likelihood 
that a constitutional challenge will fail. Other examples may be easily offered, 
all similar in the key respects discussed next. 
B. The Model and Its Context 
All of the vignettes just described have important common features. Each 
vignette involves a rational actor who may be assumed to be risk-neutral. The 
 
43. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (explaining the 
“entire fairness” test). 
44. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down SEC 
regulation for insufficient substantiation). 
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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actor would like to obtain a benefit b, but faces uncertainty regarding the 
benefit’s availability under the law. The actor chooses his position under an 
uncertain legal standard by choosing the variable x. This variable may reflect a 
percentage (of assets, economic exposure, market share, risk of loss, and the 
like), a time period (sometimes measured in days, other times in years), a 
number (of fairness opinions, expert cost-benefit reports, administrative 
hearings, and so on), or some other dimension. Various values of x (that I will 
also call the actor’s positions or compliance efforts) correspond to various 
probabilities of success on review. Assume that a greater compliance effort 
corresponds to a higher probability of success—that is, to a more compliant, 
stronger, more conservative legal position.46 Achieving higher values of x 
comes with a greater cost, however. That is, stronger positions are costlier than 
weaker ones for private actors. 
A few other features are common to all the vignettes. The uncertainty 
surrounding the availability of the benefit may not be resolved ex ante, such as 
by acquiring legal advice. After the actor chooses his position x, some authority 
will scrutinize it and either allow the benefit by finding the position to be 
compliant or deny it by finding the position to be non-compliant. That is, 
detection and scrutiny are assured. Finally, and provisionally, assume that 
violators of uncertain legal commands face no sanctions; they only lose the 
benefit b.47 
How does the actor choose x? He does so by assessing the costs and 
benefits of taking positions of varying strength. Assume that the cost depends 
on x in some yet unspecified way, so C(x) is the actor’s cost function. The actor 
who chooses any particular x incurs the cost C(x) with certainty. In contrast, the 
receipt of the benefit b is not guaranteed. Moreover, the actor can influence the 
likelihood of securing that benefit. Specifically, the probability of success 
depends on the compliance effort, x. Thus, the probability of success is not just 
a number—it is a function of x that we will call F(x). A rational actor will 
maximize his expected gain, G(x), which is the net gain from exerting the 
compliance effort x in order to obtain the benefit b with probability F(x) while 
incurring the cost C(x).48 
Having specified the key features of the model, we can now locate it in 
the literature. The optimization problem offered here is very similar to the one 
 
46. Nothing of interest would change if we made the opposite assumption. As the later 
discussion explains, the statement in the text is always true if we hold the level of uncertainty fixed, but 
not otherwise. See infra text accompanying note 160. 
47. This is a very realistic assumption for many standards and a substantial range of x 
values. For example, many tax positions that lose in court (that is, that lead the taxpayer to lose the tax 
benefit) are not subject to penalties even if the positions were worse than a fifty-fifty bet to begin with. 
See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (stating that understatement of income tax does not lead to 
penalties if it results from a position having substantial authority). Similarly, the remedy of 
disgorgement is a quintessential example of the loss of b. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) (requiring 
the disgorgement of short-swing profits by corporate insiders). 
48. Formally, the actor’s expected gain is thus: 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑏𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥). 
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explored by C&C and Shavell.49 C&C posit an actor such as a driver choosing 
how fast to drive under an uncertain negligence standard. The actor compares a 
higher certain benefit of greater speed against a higher uncertain cost of 
accidents for which the driver may be found liable.50 In contrast with the 
present setup, their model has variable (rather than fixed) benefits and 
uncertainty that relates to losses (rather than gains). Still, the two models have 
much in common, so it is important to be clear about the differences. 
Most essentially, the evaluative framework offered here differs from 
C&C’s in key respects. C&C assume that, although the law is uncertain, it is 
either socially optimal or it may be made so. They posit that there is a specific 
value of x (I will call it xso) that corresponds to the most efficient legal regime. 
Naturally, they focus on how the private actor’s choice of x compares to the 
socially optimal one. The closer x is to xso the better; x exceeding xso means 
under-deterrence (think of driving too fast) while x falling short of xso means 
over-deterrence. C&C famously conclude that legal uncertainty yields 
incentives leading to both under- and over-deterrence with an optimal legal 
standard and that both phenomena arise in their simulations. Shavell reaches a 
similar result without relying on simulations by modeling legal uncertainty as 
an error in determination of an exogenously given (though not necessarily 
optimal) level of due care.51 
As discussed in the Introduction, the social optimality assumption is 
difficult to maintain in many legal regimes. We are unlikely to know—possibly 
in theory, and certainly in practice—the welfare-maximizing amount of assets 
to be transferred in a tax-free spinoff, or the socially optimal number of fairness 
opinions, or the welfare-maximizing delay in issuing a written explanation for 
denying a government permit.52 A further difficulty arises because in any 
regulatory regime that involves transfers (taxation being an obvious example), 
the key result characterizing the social optimum—the result on which the 
optimal deterrence theory and C&C’s analysis heavily rely—does not hold.53 If 
we drop the social optimality assumption, C&C’s formal analysis no longer 
applies and their evaluative criterion is no longer available.54 Shavell does not 
 
49. This Article refers primarily to C&C’s analysis because it is more informative for 
the reasons discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 119. I discuss Shavell’s work where its 
findings or implications differ from those of C&C. 
50. Thus, C&C’s optimization problem is 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝐵(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥)𝐹(𝑥). See Craswell & 
Calfee, supra note 1, at 281. 
51. See SHAVELL, supra note 1. 
52. See T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015) (introducing 
the “essentially contemporaneous” standard for evaluating the timing of a written explanation for a 
permit denial). 
53. If, for instance, the cost imposed on the private actor by a legal regime is a 
transfer, it is no longer true that the social optimum corresponds to the point where the marginal private 
cost is equal to the marginal private benefit, as is true for regimes intended to force private actors to 
internalize externalities. 
54. The formal analysis does not apply because in the absence of the social optimality 
assumption, it is impossible to derive C&C’s first-order condition by taking advantage of the fact that at 
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rely on the social optimality of the standard of care for his analysis of 
uncertainty, but he takes this standard as a given. In contrast, when lawyers 
consider an uncertain legal test such as “substantial business activity” or 
“substantially all,” no particular number is available as an obvious reference 
point.55 
This Article offers a new interpretation of the model by shifting the focus 
from optimal deterrence to probabilistic compliance. This shift yields new 
results about the interaction between uncertainty and compliance, the effect of 
uncertainty on private gains, and the interplay between legal and detection 
uncertainty, to name a few. Notably, some of the findings arise not only from 
the present model, but also from replicating and reinterpreting C&C’s original 
simulations as well. 
C&C’s work has not been the only inquiry into the efficiency properties of 
uncertain law. Similar to this Article (and in contrast with C&C), these other 
contributions do not assume the existence of socially optimal legal rules. 
However, the uncertainty they investigate differs from the one studied here 
(and by C&C and Shavell) in key respects. 
Some scholars model uncertainty as arising from possible future 
legislative changes.56 Obviously, an individual actor may not adjust his choices 
under current law (as the present model allows) in order to influence his 
probability of success under some future yet unknown rule. Another approach 
views uncertainty as the actor’s lack of knowledge of legal consequences. 
These models allow actors to reduce or eliminate their ignorance by learning 
the rules or acquiring advice.57 In contrast, the legal uncertainty studied here is 
irreducible. In fact, acquiring advice may increase it.58 
Several authors model tax law uncertainty as a random variation of 
taxable income around the mean. Some of these models do not allow the actor 
to vary the outcome by choosing different values of x—the key feature of the 
 
the social optimum the marginal external harm is equal to the marginal private benefit. The evaluative 
criterion is unavailable because 𝑥!" is unknowable. 
55. For a suggestion on such a number, see infra text accompanying notes 103-104; 
for discussions of the weakness of this suggestion, see infra the concluding paragraphs of Sections I.E 
and II.D. 
56. See James Alm, Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare, 78 
AM. ECON. REV. 237, 237, 241 (1988). 
57. See Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayer Compliance Under Uncertainty, 8 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13-14 (1989); Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 61, 74-75, 78 (1998); Kate Krause, Tax Complexity: Problem or Opportunity?, 28 
PUB. FIN. REV. 395, 399 (2000); Suzanne Scotchmer, Who Profits from Taxpayer Confusion?, 29 ECON. 
LET. 49, 49-50 (1989). Some of the contributions expressly set aside the investigation of “arguability” 
(that is, the likelihood of success of a particular position in light of legal uncertainty). Scotchmer, supra, 
at 51. 
58. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 22.6.3 (2005) (discussing the controversy regarding the “principal place of 
business” term that preceded and followed the Supreme Court’s Soliman decision). 
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present model.59 Others are tax-specific. They incorporate uncertainty into the 
optimal tax theory or rely on unique features of the tax law.60 
A few investigations come closer to the present one in interpreting legal 
uncertainty, but they lack at least one of the key features of the proposed 
model. David Ulph investigates taxpayers who face uncertain legal commands 
(in the sense discussed here) and purchase tax schemes of various 
aggressiveness. 61  However, one of his model’s main drivers—the risk of 
retroactive legislation—is not a serious concern in most legal settings.62 Paul 
Beck and co-authors study legal uncertainty and variation in tax reporting 
aggressiveness.63 Kate Krause models a parameter that may be interpreted as 
the strength of one’s legal position as well.64 Lillian Mills and co-authors 
present a model where taxpayers may take positions of varying strength.65 And 
Michael Graetz and co-authors investigate the effect of tax advice on decisions 
of taxpayers facing different probabilities that their deductions would be 
disallowed (which the authors call “exposure”). 66  None of these models, 
however, treat the actor’s compliance effort x as an endogenous variable. In 
contrast, the fundamental question that the current model investigates is how a 
rational actor facing uncertain law chooses his compliance effort.67 
Economic models featuring an endogenous parameter similar to this 
model’s x do exist. Although they do not interpret x as the compliance effort, 
this does not necessarily make them inapplicable. Shlomo Yitzhaki considers 
 
59. See Woon-Oh Jung, Tax Reporting Game Under Uncertain Tax Laws and 
Asymmetric Information, 37 ECON. LET. 323, 323-24 (1991) (positing that “a taxpayer does not know 
her true taxable income due to tax law complexity, [but] she is assumed to be privately informed of its 
distribution”). 
60. See Kaplow, supra note 57, at 69 (connecting his analysis of taxable income 
uncertainty to the optimal tax theory and recognizing the resulting complexity); Suzanne Scotchmer & 
Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17, 19 (1989) (basing the model on 
the fact that tax understatements are subject to penalties but tax overstatements are not rewarded by the 
government). 
61. Ulph uses the term “legal effectiveness” rather than aggressiveness. See David 
Ulph, Avoidance Policies—A New Conceptual Framework 1, 7 (Oxford Univ., Ctr. for Bus. Taxation 
Working Paper No. 09/22, 2009). 
62. See id. at 8-20. For a discussion of this and other limitations of Ulph’s analysis, as 
well as a discussion of other scholars’ contributions mentioned in this paragraph, see Alex Raskolnikov, 
Six Degrees of Graduation: Law and Economics of Variable Sanctions, 43 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1015, 1027-
28 (2016). 
63. See, e.g., Paul J. Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure and Penalty Laws, 2 J. PUB. 
ECON. THEORY 243 (2000). 
64. See Krause, supra note 57, at 400. 
65. See Lillian F. Mills et al., FIN 48 and Tax Compliance, 85 ACCT. REV. 1721, 
1726-27 (2010). 
66. See Michael J. Graetz et al., Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A 
Strategic Analysis 5 (Cal. Inst. of Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 710, 1989). 
67. Mark Cronshaw and James Alm offer a model that includes a parameter (α), 
defined as “the probability that a high-income taxpayer reports low (i.e., the probability of 
noncompliance or cheating).” Mark B. Cronshaw & James Alm, Tax Compliance with Two-Sided 
Uncertainty, 23 PUB. FIN. Q. 139, 144 (1995). Importantly, the taxpayer in the model is free to choose 
the value of α, making it endogenous. It is unclear, however, what this probability corresponds to in real 
life—that is, how a taxpayer may choose this probability. 
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the probability of detection that depends on the amount of evaded income 
chosen by the taxpayer.68 Louis Kaplow studies the probability of detection that 
varies with the taxpayers’ expenditures on concealing their evasion.69 However, 
neither model links the endogenous choice of x to a probability distribution of 
the kind considered here.70 Therefore, neither model sheds light on how this 
distribution affects the choice of x—the central question of this Article. 
Overall, the decades-old contributions by C&C and Shavell remain the 
leading economic inquiries into rational decision-making under uncertain legal 
commands.71 Therefore, this Article uses their findings as reference points. 
C. The Meaning of Probabilities 
The basic model presented in the previous section has only three 
variables. Two of the three require little elaboration. The benefit b is assumed 
to be fixed, and the cost C(x) reflects the cost of compliance, whatever it may 
be. The meaning and shape of the probability distribution F(x), however, is far 
from obvious. 
C&C spend little time on investigating the source of the distributions they 
use and the meaning of probability statements they make. In their first article, 
they introduce three bell-shaped curves as “three possible distributions of 
probabilities”72 without further elaboration. In their later, more formal piece 
they assume a “probability density function associated with the uncertain legal 
standard.” 73  Shavell says even less about the probability distribution he 
studies.74 These generic specifications are standard and uncontroversial for 
legal economists. But they have perplexed or troubled lawyers and academics 
 
68. See Shlomo Yitzhaki, On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 123, 
127 (1987). 
69. See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. 
PUB. ECON. 221, 230 (1990). 
70 . Neither Yitzhaki nor Kaplow discuss the likely shape of the probability 
distribution, and there appears to be no reason to assume that the relationship between the probability of 
detection and either the amount of evaded income (in Yitzhaki) or the concealment efforts (in Kaplow) 
has the shape that is posited here; nor is either distribution bounded like the present one. In fact, it 
appears plausible to assume that increasing the endogenous parameter (the amount evaded or the 
concealment effort) yields diminishing marginal returns, producing a concave density function in 
contrast with an S-shaped one discussed in the next section. 
71. For recent work relying on C&C’s analysis of legal uncertainty with an implicit 
assumption that this analysis reflects our best understanding of the subject, see Daniel Shaviro, 
Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 241 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2008); Sven Hoeppner & Laura Lyhs, 
Behavior Under Vague Standards: Evidence from the Laboratory (JENA Economic Research Paper 
#2016-010). 
72. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1, at 971 
73. Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 281 n.6. 
74. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 105-106. 
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interested in legal uncertainty as it actually exists.75 Therefore, we take up the 
task of demystifying F(x). 
Thus far, we have only said that F(x) reflects the uncontroversial 
assumption that the probability of success depends on the compliance effort. 
The more assets the corporation transfers, the more likely it is to meet the 
“substantially all” tax standard. The more fairness opinions the board of 
directors obtains, the more likely it is to satisfy the “entire fairness” test. What 
more can be said about F(x)? And how can the answer be connected to the 
basic probability theory? To address these questions, we begin by reflecting on 
how legal advisors interpret uncertain standards. 
To start, note that in many cases, x is bounded. In terms of the model, it 
varies between 0 and 1. That is because no matter how vague the standard, 
lawyers know that some compliance effort satisfies the standard for certain, and 
some other level of effort flunks it just as surely. For example, lawyers may 
conclude that transferring 0% (or 20%, or even 40%) of the assets definitely 
flunks the “substantially all” test while transferring 100% of the assets (or 95%, 
or even 90%) certainly satisfies it. Or lawyers may believe that a single fairness 
opinion is certainly insufficient under the “entire fairness” test while a dozen 
opinions is surely enough. To take another example, lawyers may opine that a 
two-day gap definitely satisfies the “essentially contemporaneous” threshold 
while a month-long delay certainly does not.76 In any of these cases, the lower 
bound of x (producing certain noncompliance) corresponds to zero and the 
upper bound of x (producing certain compliance) corresponds to one. To 
simplify the exposition, assume that lawyers believe that the “substantially all” 
standard is surely not met if a taxpayer transfers no assets at all and is surely 
met if the taxpayer transfers all assets. So the [0,1] range for x corresponds to 
0% to 100% of the assets. 
Within the 0-to-1 (or 0% to 100% of the assets) range, lawyers’ beliefs 
typically have the following structure. First, a lawyer would be prepared to tell 
the client what he views as the best interpretation of the “substantially all” 
standard or any other standard if he had to pick a single number. To make the 
matter more concrete, let us assume that this number is 0.6 (or 60% of the 
assets). Moreover, the legal advisor would typically explain that there is a 
relatively small range of percentage values that likely describes the uncertain 
standard in question. Let us say that this range is between 0.5 and 0.7. Finally, 
the lawyer would say that he is almost certain that the share of assets that 
constitutes “substantially all” is between 0.4 and 0.8. 
These views mean that the relationship between the compliance effort x 
(here, the percentage of assets transferred) and the probability of success F(x) is 
 
75. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1017, 1022-23 (2009) (arguing that with a few exceptions, “legal scholarship has not 
focused on the question of what probability statements mean” and that adopting a particular meaning of 
probability statements “may reverse other legal scholars’ results”). 
76. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015). 
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not linear. The probability of success remains very close to zero for a range of 
low values of x, and it is very close to 100% for a range of high values of x. In 
some middle region, however, the probability of success increases relatively 
fast. In the current example, this region is between 50% and 70% of the assets 
(0.5<x<0.7). Thus, the relationship between the compliance effort x and the 
probability of success F(x) is S-shaped—it combines two areas of slow increase 
for very weak and very strong positions and an area of fast increase in the 
middle. This non-linear relationship is depicted as a dotted line in Figure 1. 
The non-linearity assumption reflected in the S-shaped probability of 
success curve is not based on prior literature. Rather, it reflects my experience 
in interpreting and explaining legal standards as well as in giving legal advice.77 
I believe, however, that the vast majority of lawyers will view this assumption 
as entirely uncontroversial in a very large number of cases.78 The vast majority 
of lawyers would also agree that, even though they often describe the 
likelihood of success to their clients in probabilistic terms, they do not interpret 
terms like “due” or “substantially all” by imagining a distribution of outcomes 
from multiple re-litigations of the client’s transaction. Instead, lawyers 
generally consider the relevant authorities and exercise their judgment. In the 
language of the probability theory, the probabilities that lawyers articulate are 
subjectivist, not frequentist; they reflect beliefs, not lotteries.79 
It is possible, however, to re-conceptualize the S-shaped curve in 
frequentist terms. This would allow us to deploy the basic analytical tools of 
the probability theory. Recall that lawyers believe that “substantially all” likely 
means 60% of the assets; it is highly likely to fall in the 50%-70% range; and it 
almost certainly lies in the 40%-80% range. These beliefs reflect legal 
uncertainty—the possibility that some legal experts would draw the line at 
some percentage of the assets other than sixty. We can envision a distribution 
of views about the value of x expressed by hypothetical experts (regulators, 
 
77. Experimental psychology has developed a very similar view of how people make 
uncertain judgments about probabilities. See, e.g., David Piercy, Motivated Reasoning and Verbal vs. 
Numerical Probability Assessment: Evidence from an Accounting Context, 108 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 330, 331-32 (2009) (discussing the “membership function”). The 
discussion in the text applies to interpretations of all uncertain statements, not only probabilistic ones. 
78. In fact, the members of the Tax Forum and the Tax Club (mostly tax partners at 
the leading New York firms) found the S-shaped curve to be self-evident. In the academic literature, 
Mark Gergen presents a related S-shaped curve. See Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 282 (2002). Gergen’s curve is essentially identical to the 
one presented here, but only if we assume a constant relationship between the cost of taking a position 
(Gergen’s x-axis, and C(x) in the present model) and the compliance effort (the x-axis in Figure 1). This, 
however, would be a highly implausible assumption. In a different article, Gergen assumes a linear 
rather than an S-shaped relationship between the aggressiveness of a tax position (i.e. “probability tax is 
owed”) and the expected loss from an audit with automatic penalty. See Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty 
and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453, 485 (2011). 
79. For an extended discussion of this point, see Lawsky, supra note 75. A frequentist 
probability is an expectation based on a large number of objective observations, such as multiple coin 
tosses. A subjectivist probability is a number reflecting the strength of a person’s belief. 
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judges, or legal advisors80) answering the question: “What fraction of the assets 
amounts to ‘substantially all’ if you had to give a single number?” Answers to 
this question would produce a distribution of views that may be described by a 
density function f(x). Assume that the answer given most frequently would be 
60%, producing the peak of the distribution. A large majority of experts would 
give an answer that falls between 50% and 70%, yielding high density near the 
peak. And almost everyone’s answer would be somewhere between forty and 
80% of the assets, meaning that the probability density outside of this range is 
very low.81 Finally, everyone would agree that transferring no assets means 
certain noncompliance while transferring all assets amounts to certain 
compliance. Thus, the density function is bounded on a [0,1] range. 
We can assume that the density function f(x) is continuous and 
differentiable. 82  This function has a corresponding cumulative distribution 
function F(x).83 Each value of F(xi) is the probability that the actor would be 
allowed to claim the benefit b upon choosing the compliance effort xi given the 
density function f(x).84 As long as the density function has a single peak—that 
is, as long as legal experts’ views converge toward a particular interpretation of 
an uncertain law—the distribution function has the S-shape identical to the 
intuitive probability of success curve reflecting subjectivist probabilities. In 
fact, the dotted line in Figure 1 reflects both the distribution function F(x) and 
the subjectivist probability curve described above. Therefore, the subjectivist 
and the frequentist understandings of legal uncertainty can be merged for the 
purposes of the model considered here.85 The following discussion does not 
distinguish between the two. 
Note that both of these understandings differ from yet another meaning of 
uncertainty sometimes encountered in the literature. For instance, Petro 
Lisowsky and co-authors posit “a continuum from highly certain (least 
 
80 . Of course, the views of private lawyers and government rulemakers may 
diverge—a possibility considered infra Section II.E. 
81 . If these answers result from an actual large-numbers survey, the resulting 
probability density function is frequentist (with respect to experts’ views). If, more realistically, the 
answers are the product of a legal expert’s imagination, the resulting distribution is subjectivist, but with 
a frequentist flavor. Either way, the imaginary multiple answers allow us to construct a probability 
density function that an exercise of a legal judgment cannot produce. 
82. This is a standard assumption. See, e.g., Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 3, at 171. 
83. The density function f(x) is a derivative of the cumulative distribution function 
F(x). That is, 𝐹! 𝑥 = 𝑓 𝑥 , 𝐹 𝑥 = 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!! , 𝐹 𝑥! = 0, and 𝐹 𝑥! = 1, where 𝑥!  and 𝑥! are lower 
and upper bounds of the range on which 𝐹 𝑥  is defined (for our purposes, this range is [0,1]). 
84. As x increases from 0 to 1, so does 𝐹 𝑥 . In terms of our example, transferring no 
assets at all (x=0) is certain to flunk the “substantially all” test (𝐹 𝑥 =0), while transferring all assets 
(x=1) is certain to satisfy it (𝐹 𝑥 =1). Thus, the probability of success is non-negative and increasing in 
x. 
85. This conclusion also makes it clear that the term “uncertainty” used here, by C&C, 
and in much of the literature on the subject, refers to what the probability theory calls “risk” as opposed 
to “ambiguity.” For a discussion, see Eric Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual 
Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 763-65 (2009). 
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aggressive) to highly uncertain (most aggressive)” tax positions.86 Kyle Logue 
discusses positions that are close to “tax evasion, where there is little 
substantive legal uncertainty (i.e., the positions will almost certainly be shot 
down if detected).”87 Both of these statements focus on the uncertainty of a 
particular position given ambiguous law, not on the extent to which the law 
itself is uncertain. The uncertainty of a position and the uncertainty of a legal 
standard are related but different. The former is endogenous while the latter is 
exogenous. A regulated party has no power to clarify the uncertain legal 
standard (change the shape of F(x)), but is free to eliminate all uncertainty by 
choosing certain compliance or something close to it.88 This Article’s focus is 
on the relationship between the exogenous uncertainty of legal standards and 
the endogenous choice of compliance efforts. 
D. The Basic Results 
Having specified the relationship between the compliance effort x and the 
probability of success F(x) as well as the meaning of the F(x) function, we can 
now get a sense of how the expected gain from taking an uncertain position 
varies with the compliance effort. We start with the most basic case and address 
multiple complications later. 89  Figure 1 demonstrates some possibilities 
graphically for a simplified gain function featuring a linear cost and a benefit 
normalized to unity.90 Continuing with the example of a corporate transfer of 
“substantially all” of the assets, Actor 1 views asset transfers as less costly than 
Actor 2. The gain curves G1 and G2 reflecting the private gains of the two 
actors result from subtracting the respective cost curves from the same 
expected benefit curve represented by the dotted line. So, for example, when 
x=0.6, bF(x)=0.5, and C1(x)=0.3. Subtracting the latter from the former (or, 
alternatively, adding 0.5 to -0.3) produces the value of 0.2 on the G1 curve. 
 
 
86. Petro Lisowsky et al., Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately 
Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity?, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 583, 584 n.2 (2013). 
87. Kyle Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX 
REV. 339, 397 (2005). For another example of this understanding of legal uncertainty, see Anthony 
D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). 
88. In this model’s terms, there is no uncertainty if x=1 nor if x=0. This is Logue’s 
view. See Logue, supra note 87. Lisowsky et al. appear to suggest that most aggressive positions (where 
x approaches 0) are highly uncertain—a difficult conclusion to defend. See Lisowsky et al., supra note 
86. 
89. For instance, convex cost functions are considered later in this section, and in infra 
Sections II.A and II.B, infra. Non-differentiable cost functions are discussed in infra Section III.B. Other 
complications are introduced infra Part III as well. 
90. This simplified function has the form of 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝐹(𝑥) − 𝑘𝑥 . The linear cost 
function means that the company views a transfer of each additional unit of assets as equally 
undesirable. Normalization to unity (that is, assuming that 𝑏 = 1) is a standard move in economic 
modeling that eliminates a distraction of a non-consequential fixed variable. See, e.g., Christopher F. 
Baum et al., Securities Fraud and Corporate Board Turnover: New Evidence from Lawsuit Outcomes, 
48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 14, 19 (2016). 
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Figure 1: The S-Shaped Probability of Success Curve and the Illustrative Cost 
and Gain Functions91 
 
 
 
Several observations follow readily from Figure 1. First, the gain function 
is wavy—it has a minimum and a maximum. This presents a problem for 
determining the actor’s privately optimal compliance effort x* algebraically.92 
C&C faced the same problem and resolved it by relying on several 
assumptions. Two of these assumptions are less warranted beyond the types of 
settings (such as speeding and pollution 93) that served as their primary 
examples.94 The third one is restrictive and is not made here.95 Because it is 
 
91. The probability of success curve 𝐹(𝑥) and the curve 𝑏𝐹(𝑥) are the same because 𝑏 = 1. 𝑥!∗ and 𝑥!∗ are the privately optimal compliance efforts of Actor 1 and Actor 2. 𝑥!∗ yields the 
maximum gain of 𝐺!∗ while 𝑥!∗ yields the maximum gain of zero (meaning that Actor 2 will not engage 
in the transaction). 𝑥!!  corresponds to the local maximum 𝐺!!  on the gain curve for Actor 2. This 
maximum is local because that actor would rather abstain from acting than act and expect a negative 
gain (𝐺!!<0). 
92. The private maximum corresponds to the first derivative 𝐺′(𝑥) = 0 (this is the 
first-order condition or FOC) and the second derivative 𝐺!! 𝑥 < 0 (this is the second-order condition or 
SOC). In the general case, the SOC is 𝐺!! 𝑥 = 𝑏𝑓′ 𝑥 − 𝐶!! 𝑥 . The sign of this expression may be 
positive or negative as each term may be greater or smaller than zero. In the simple case depicted in 
Figure 1, the SOC is 𝐺!! 𝑥 = 𝑓′ 𝑥 . If 𝑓 𝑥  has a single peak, as the discussion assumes throughout, 
any x satisfying the SOC that exceeds the peak corresponds to the maximum. 
93. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1, at 967, 968, 970, 980. 
94. C&C conclude that the private gain function has an internal maximum by 
assuming that the SOC is negative. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 282 n.7. They explain that 
the first three terms in their SOC are unambiguously negative. However, the first term B′′(𝑥) is negative 
only if the private benefit function is concave, as C&C assume on page 280. The second term is positive 
(it is being subtracted) only if C′′ 𝑥 > 0 (the cost function is convex), as C&C assume on page 280 as 
well. (An alternative, less restrictive assumption that C&C also sometimes make is that B′′ 𝑥 < 𝐶′′(𝑥). 
This allows for a concave cost function and makes it less likely that the first three terms in the SOC are 
negative.) So the first three terms are indeed negative only as long as C&C’s assumptions hold. As 
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impossible to solve the model algebraically in the general case,96 the following 
analysis relies on simulations (much of C&C’s analysis does the same).97 
The second observation is that the privately optimal compliance effort 
x*—the value of x corresponding to the highest point on the gain curve—may 
lie inside the [0,1] interval or at zero. That is, a rational actor facing an 
ambiguous legal standard may choose to take an uncertain position (𝑥!∗ = 0.8 
for Actor 1) or abstain from acting altogether (𝑥!∗ = 0 for Actor 2). For a given 
likelihood of success (same F(x)), higher costs reduce the expected gain98 and 
may make the gamble not worth taking.99 None of this is surprising. C&C 
clearly showed that rational actors may take uncertain legal positions. They did 
not investigate the choice of not acting at all, but their model would easily 
produce this result. 
 
mentioned in the text, these are plausible assumptions when one thinks about accident-producing 
behavior, but not in many other cases. For instance, the benefits from gradually monopolizing an 
industry, from increasing network coverage over a given territory, or from investing in technology 
whose adoption involves a tipping point are all likely to be convex rather than concave (as C&C 
assume) at least over some range of x. 
95. As C&C state (and assuming that the sum of the first three terms is indeed 
negative), the SOC is negative “as long as F′′(𝑥)𝐿(𝑥) never takes on a large negative value . . . . If the 
density function is single-peaked [an assumption also made here], this is equivalent to assuming that it 
does not fall away extremely rapidly at values of x above the value at which it peaks. For the remainder 
of the paper, we will make this assumption.” Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 282 n.7. The shape of 
the benefit and loss function, as well as the density function, affect what “extremely rapidly” means in 
any given case. The general point, however, is that as the law becomes increasingly clear—as 
uncertainty declines—the density function does indeed begin to fall extremely rapidly at values of x 
above the peak. At that point, C&C’s model no longer yields a clear prediction of individual behavior 
even given a concave benefit and convex loss functions that they assumed. 
96. Technically, the problem arises because it is impossible to sign the SOC. By the 
“general case,” I mean the case where the cost function is not necessarily linear and the restrictive 
assumptions made by C&C may not be made. 
97. I produced simulations using Microsoft Excel. I input the 𝑥 values (from 0 to 100, 
or 0 to 1,000 to match C&C’s approach) manually as the first column. The second column reflected the 
corresponding values of a cumulative distribution function (CDF) 𝐹(𝑥). Where possible (such as for a 
normal distribution), these values were generated using Excel’s built-in formulas and manually chosen 
CDF parameters (such as the mean and the standard deviation for a normal distribution). In the absence 
of built-in formulas (such as for a triangular distribution), the CDFs were constructed manually. The 
third column contained the values of a cost function corresponding to each value of 𝑥. For these 
Article’s original simulations, the cost function was either linear or convex. For replicating C&C’s 
simulations the cost function matched the one that they used. The fourth column contained the values of 
the 𝐺(𝑥) function reflected in supra note 48 for the Article’s original simulations and supra note 50 for 
the replications of C&C’s simulations. I used a built-in Excel function to find the maximum value of the 
gain function in the 𝐺(𝑥) column. I then identified the values of 𝑥∗, 𝐹(𝑥∗), and 𝐺(𝑥∗) produced by the 
distribution with particular parameters (such as a specific mean and standard deviation of a normal 
distribution). Finally, I repeated this process while varying the CDF parameters and CDF functional 
forms. 
98. This result may be shown algebraically as well, and it is not restricted to linear 
cost functions. Assume that the cost function has a form of 𝐶(𝑥) = 𝑘𝑥! (t=1 corresponds to a linear 
cost, t=2 to a linear marginal cost, and higher values of t correspond to steeper cost functions). 
Differentiating the gain function with respect to the two cost factors yields: 𝜕𝐺(𝑥) 𝜕𝑘 = −𝑥!, which is 
negative for any 𝑥 > 0; 𝜕𝐺(𝑥) 𝜕𝑡 = −𝑘𝑥! ln 𝑥, which is non-positive for any 𝑥 > 0 and 𝑡 ≥ 1. 
99. If the cost function is non-linear, and if we assume, as is conventional in the 
literature, that 𝐶 𝑥 = 0;𝐶! 𝑥 = 0, the actor will abstain from acting if extending any compliance 
effort at all gives rise to a fixed cost—something that is likely to be true in most cases. 
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Another insight suggested by Figure 1 is that higher compliance costs 
induce rational actors to diminish their compliance efforts. For example, 𝑥!∗  in 
Figure 1 is greater than 𝑥!!  (the effort corresponding to the local, rather than 
global, G2 maximum).100 This is not an accident. Consider what would happen 
if the cost of compliance were to go down to zero. The gain curve would then 
coincide with the dotted S-shaped line, and the maximum gain would be 
reached for x* equal to one—the position assuring certain compliance. If 
compliance is costlier, however, perfection no longer makes sense. 
These results are useful but hardly path-breaking. One reiterates C&C’s 
well-known finding; others follow from their model. Another question arising 
from examining Figure 1 is quite different. It is addressed next. 
E. From Deterrence to Compliance 
The simple yet fundamental question is this: How should we evaluate the 
actor’s compliance effort, x*? In the optimal deterrence framework adopted by 
C&C, the answer is clear: we should evaluate x* by comparing it to the socially 
optimal effort xso.101 The closer the x* is to xso, the better. If x* exceeds xso, we 
have under-deterrence; if x* is below xso then over-deterrence results. Think of 
60 mph as the socially optimal speed and the uncertain negligence standard 
producing a single-peak density function centered on 0.6. If the standard 
induces drivers to go 90 mph, uncertainty leads to under-deterrence; if they 
drive 55 mph, the law slightly over-deters. 
But what if we have no view about the efficiency of the law? How should 
we assess actor’s choices in the absence of the socially optimal level as a 
reference point? To the best of my knowledge, this deceptively simple question 
has not been addressed in the economic analysis of law.102 
This is a fundamental problem that must be resolved before the analysis 
can move forward. For instance, the value of 𝑥!∗  in Figure 1 is 0.8. Is this low 
or high? How should we evaluate a particular position when the law is neither 
certain nor socially optimal? 
There are at least two possible ways of doing so. First, we may ask what 
value of x we would pick if we were choosing a single number as the best 
approximation for separating legal and illegal conduct. The most reasonable 
 
100. As mentioned earlier, Actor 2 would not choose 𝑥!! , but rather abstain from 
acting altogether. 
101. In Shavell’s model, the answer is also clear: we should compare x* to the 
exogenous level of due care. 
102. The only alternative to the optimal deterrence theory in the law and economics 
literature is the so-called complete deterrence approach. That approach does not assume socially optimal 
legal rules, but it generally treats legal rules as clear, giving rational actors a binary choice of complying 
or violating the law. In that setting, the obvious way to evaluate a private decision is by checking 
whether it is legal. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 215-218. Importantly, in both the 
optimal and the complete deterrence settings, there is a precisely specified value of x that separates 
desirable from undesirable behavior. 
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answer is the value that most legal experts would identify if they had to give a 
single number for the meaning of an uncertain standard. This is the value of x 
corresponding to the peak of the density function f(x)—the value reflecting the 
prevailing, most common interpretation. For many plausible probability 
distributions, this peak value corresponds to F(x)=0.5, the 50% probability of 
success.103 Let us call this peak value xp. 
A useful feature of xp is that, to put it bluntly, it is the only clear 
benchmark other than zero and one for a single-peak probability distribution.104 
It reveals information in a setting where no other obvious benchmark exists. 
And this information is useful. Most importantly, focusing on xp highlights the 
relativity of x*. It is impossible to decide whether any given x* is high or low 
without knowing the corresponding xp. 
This point is obvious to any legal practitioner. If a company must transfer 
“substantially all” assets to secure a regulatory benefit (a fairly high xp), 
transferring 60% may not be enough. If, instead, the threshold is something like 
“material” share of assets (a much lower xp), the same 60% level is almost 
unassailable. 
Finally, xp has a clear connection to Shavell’s analysis. He models 
uncertainty as an error term around a particular value of x. He places very few 
restrictions on the shape of the error distribution, but his key assumption is that 
the magnitude of error declines as uncertainty declines.105 The most plausible 
interpretation of this assumption is that as a vague standard becomes clearer, 
the distribution of possible interpretations of that standard converges to xp.106 
The second way of evaluating x* is by investigating the corresponding 
probability of success F(x*). This approach shifts focus from deterrence to 
compliance, from the territory familiar to legal economists to the territory 
familiar to legal practitioners. 
The importance of the probability of success is self-evident to any lawyer. 
It is especially familiar to any counselor engaged in opinion practice. Legal 
advisors have developed numerous opinion levels ranging from “will” (very 
high likelihood of success) to “reasonable basis” (low but not negligible 
 
103. This is true for any symmetric distribution such as a normal distribution. 
104. This is clearly true for symmetric distributions because for these distributions, the 
mean, the median, and the mode are the same. For skewed distributions, the mean and median must be 
calculated, and are sometimes not defined. In contrast, the mode (the technical term for xp) is a defined 
value that may be produced by a legal expert’s introspection for any single-peak distribution. Note that 
the mode is not defined for a uniform distribution. But this distribution is not single-peaked. It is 
equivalent to legal experts thinking that any value of x is as likely to assure compliance as any other 
value of x—not a plausible description of reality. 
105. See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 94. 
106. This is not true for a uniform distribution because it has no xp. However, as 
discussed in supra note 104, a uniform distribution is not a plausible depiction of legal uncertainty. The 
statement in the text may also not hold more generally in theory. But it is difficult to imagine, when 
talking about legal uncertainty in practice, how a single-peaked distribution of the views of legal experts 
would converge to some value of x other than xp as uncertainty declines. 
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likelihood of success) and even less plausible positions.107 To an outsider, these 
opinion levels are extraordinarily nuanced. For instance, the “will” level 
includes unqualified “will,” “not free from doubt will,” and “not entirely free 
from doubt will” opinions. Lawyers routinely suggest percentages 
corresponding to various opinion levels.108 There is some disagreement about 
what these numbers are, but everyone agrees that these percentages refer to the 
likelihood of success. 109  And clients are extremely sensitive to these 
percentages and levels of “comfort.” Multi-billion dollar deals depend on 
lawyers’ conclusions regarding the likelihood that the transaction would 
withstand regulatory scrutiny.110 Thus, the realities of legal practice leave no 
doubt about the importance of F(x). 
The American Bar Association’s efforts to define the bounds of ethical 
legal advice further bolster the point. These efforts (some would say struggles) 
make it quite clear that the ABA views the likelihood of success as the key 
factor in separating ethical and unethical conduct.111 Equally clear is the ABA’s 
unease with positions that are highly unlikely to prevail.112 
Government regulators view the probability of success as an important 
factor as well. They also reveal a preference for more compliant (higher 
probability of success) positions. And they particularly disfavor positions that 
are more likely to be wrong than right. 
The SEC, for instance, instructs issuers taking uncertain tax positions that 
fall short of the “will” level “to explain why [the counsel or accountant] cannot 
give a ‘will’ opinion.”113 The Commission does not even contemplate that 
issuers would go forward with transactions that are not supported by at least a 
“more likely than not” opinion of counsel.114 The FASB forbids the issuers 
from reflecting uncertain tax benefits in financial statements unless the issuer 
believes that there is more than a 50% chance that the benefit will be 
 
107. These are described by standards like “not frivolous” or a “reporting position.” 
108. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Painting Accounting Practitioners 
into a Tax Practice Corner, 108 TAX NOTES 1399, 1399 (2005) (describing various opinion levels and 
the corresponding probabilities of success). 
109. See Kyle Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. 
TAX REV. 339, 357 (2005). 
110. For example, the $33 billion Williams-Energy Transfer merger hinged entirely on 
whether one elite law firm reasonably refused to give a “should” opinion while another elite law firm 
believed that such an opinion would properly reflect the state of the law. See supra note 15. 
111. See ABA Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reconsidering ABA Formal Op. 314 (1965). 
112. See id. for a discussion of concerns with lawyers endorsing positions supported 
by merely a “colorable claim”—a less likely to succeed position than the one that has “some realistic 
possibility of success,” which, in turn, is less likely to succeed than a position supported by “substantial 
authority”—the threshold required by the Internal Revenue Code to avoid penalties for undisclosed 
positions. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2012). 
113 . SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 19 ¶ III.C.4 (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov.interps/legal/cfslb.19.htm. 
114. Id. 
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sustained. 115  Congress is willing to forgive tax penalties if “the taxpayer 
reasonably believed that [the] treatment was more likely than not the proper 
one.”116 And the Treasury Department likened legal opinions that fall short of 
the “more likely than not” level to advice plagued by conflicts of interest.117 
Overall, government regulators, self-regulatory bodies, and legal 
practitioners all care about the likelihood that an uncertain position would be 
upheld on review. So the second way of assessing the actor’s compliance effort 
is by evaluating the resulting probability of success. 
Note that this probability has one obvious advantage over xp. The latter is 
just one point in a distribution; the former is a continuous variable spanning 
certain compliance and certain noncompliance. Focusing on the probability of 
success leads to a greater precision in evaluating rational responses to legal 
standards even if the law does not maximize efficiency and the optimal 
deterrence theory is unhelpful. We now turn to this evaluation. 
II. Investigating the Model 
Adopting the probabilistic compliance framework allows us to analyze the 
model introduced in Part I—or the similar model studied by C&C—from a new 
perspective. We can investigate whether higher (or lower) legal uncertainty 
induces rational actors to take more compliant, higher probability of success 
positions. We can inquire into the private consequences of these decisions—
with and without taking account of the market for legal advice. And we can ask 
how policymakers should react to private responses to legal uncertainty if 
policymakers care about compliance. This Part tackles these and related 
questions. 
A. The Famous Ambiguity Reexamined 
We begin this investigation by reexamining the best-known result reached 
by both C&C and Shavell regarding the effect of legal uncertainty on individual 
behavior—their conclusion that uncertainty may lead to either over- or under-
deterrence even if the legal standard is set correctly on average.118 Shavell 
reaches this result with very few assumptions about the shape of legal 
uncertainty. However, his analysis is highly general, making it difficult to get a 
 
115. See Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes (2010). 
116. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3) (2012). 
117. See Practice Before IRS—Best Practices for Tax Advisors—Shelter Opinions, 
T.D. 9165, 2005-1 C.B. 357, replaced by T.D. 9668, 2014-27 I.R.B. 1. 
118. For C&C, “correctly” means socially optimally. See Calfee & Craswell, supra 
note 1, at 974. For Shavell, “correctly” means at the level of due care that an actor would choose in the 
absence of uncertainty. See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 97. 
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sense of its practical implications.119  Moreover, no one has succeeded in 
extending Shavell’s model beyond his key finding in three decades. C&C 
obtained their result by relying on simulations, and this Article follows the 
same approach. 
In order to generate their simulations, C&C needed to assume a functional 
form of legal uncertainty. As is common, they assumed that it is normally 
distributed, and this Article does the same.120 However, a normal distribution is 
defined on the range of plus/minus infinity rather than [0,1]. This Article’s 
original simulations truncate the distribution to fit the [0,1] interval by choosing 
such parameters (mean and variance) that the probability of occurrence (the 
density function) at either end of the [0,1] interval is equal to zero up to three 
decimal points.121 This assures that for x approximating zero (almost no effort 
to comply) the probability of success is almost zero as well, while for x 
approximating one (almost the highest possible compliance effort) the 
probability of success is also one (100%).122 As will become clear shortly, C&C 
did not impose similar restrictions in their simulations. 
C&C interpret their results by focusing on what this Article calls the 
compliance effort x*. They determine privately optimal efforts corresponding to 
various degrees of uncertainty and compare them to the socially optimal value 
of xso. What would happen if we shift the analytical framework from deterrence 
to compliance, from comparing x* to xso to evaluating the value of F(x*)? 
It turns out that this question has the same answer if we consider this 
Article’s model or C&C’s formula. To emphasize the general nature of that 
answer, it is presented here using C&C’s original simulations. Table 1 
replicates one of their scenarios (a combination of the gain and loss functions 
and a normal distribution with a particular mean) in the first two columns.123 
 
119. Conceptually, of course, the general form of Shavell’s proof makes it especially 
valuable. But practically, his conclusion that uncertainty leads to over-deterrence as long as “the 
distribution of the deviations is not too dispersed” gives the reader no way of assessing what “too 
dispersed” might mean. In contrast, simulations offer a better sense of the extent of uncertainty, 
including in situations when the results become questionable. See infra text accompanying notes 130-
133. 
120. For a recent example of using a normal distribution assumption to model legal 
uncertainty, see Hoeppner & Lyhs, supra note 71, at 6. A related literature on litigation settlement 
predominantly relies on this assumption as well. See Marc Poitras & Ralph Frasca, A Unified Model of 
Settlement and Trial Expenditures: The Priest-Klein Model Extended, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 188, 
190 (2011). 
121. This is a crude solution. A transformation that would convert the distribution’s 
[-∞,+∞] range into [0,1] range would be preferable. This was not the path followed by C&C, however, 
and I do not follow it here. 
122. In other words, this assures that F(x) satisfies one of the basic features of a 
cumulative density function. See supra note 83. 
123. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 284 tbl.1 (column corresponding to the 
mean of 500). 
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The third column is new, and it shows the values of the probability of success 
for each choice of x* reported by C&C.124 The results are quite striking.125 
 
Table 1: The Effect of a Change in Uncertainty on the Privately Optimal 
Compliance Effort and the Corresponding Probability of Success 
St Dev x* F(x*) 
1 497 1.00 
10 476 0.99 
50 425 0.93 
100 407 0.82 
200 429 0.64 
300 466 0.55 
400 500 0.50 
500 529 0.48 
1000 626 0.45 
 
 
The first two columns show that even when legal uncertainty is symmetric 
and centered on the social optimum (here, xso=xp=500) both under- and over-
deterrence are possible. The behavior is optimal when uncertainty is 
vanishingly small (the distribution’s standard deviation σ—a basic statistical 
measure of uncertainty—is equal to 1) or very significant (σ=400).126 But when 
uncertainty is high, under-deterrence results,127 and when uncertainty is lower 
we observe over-deterrence. Moreover, the relationship between uncertainty 
and deterrence is non-monotone. Starting with extreme uncertainty (σ=1000), a 
decrease in uncertainty first moves the actor’s choice from under-deterrence to 
the optimum (1000>σ>400), then produces increasing over-deterrence 
(400>σ>100), and finally reduces over-deterrence bringing the behavior back 
to the optimum (100>σ>1). In stark contrast, when we turn from deterrence to 
compliance (that is, the probability of success F(x)), the relationship is much 
more straightforward: lower uncertainty leads to greater compliance. 
This is no small difference. Private choices viewed as equivalent in 
C&C’s framework are anything but equivalent in the present one. For instance, 
C&C’s simulations show that both high uncertainty (σ=400) and extreme 
 
124. Because C&C use F(x) as a probability of liability (bad outcome), while I use 
F(x) as a probability of success (good outcome), the F(x) values reported in the table correspond to (1-
F(x)) values in the C&C’s simulations. 
125. All simulations and graphs are available upon request to the author. 
126. This and similar statements treat x*=497 as essentially equal to 500. 
127. Recall that in C&C’s setup, higher values of x* are less socially desirable (think 
of higher speeds), while in the present setup higher x* reflects greater compliance (think of transferring 
more assets to satisfy the “substantially all” standard). 
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certainty (σ=1) induce private actors to take the socially optimal position 
(x*=500). But from the compliance perspective, the two could not be more 
different. High uncertainty (σ=400) leads merely to a plausible but hardly 
indisputable fifty-fifty position (F(x*)=0.5), while extreme certainty induces 
certain compliance (F(x*)=1). Relatedly, some changes viewed as undesirable 
in C&C’s optimal deterrence framework are clearly desirable if one prefers 
more compliance to less. For instance, as the standard deviation changes from 
400 to 100 (legal uncertainty decreases), the behavior gets worse (x* falling 
away from xso) from the optimal deterrence perspective while those concerned 
with compliance would conclude that the behavior improves (F(x*) increases 
from 0.48 to 0.82). 
These results are not idiosyncratic. In fact, every C&C scenario featuring 
a symmetric distribution centered on xso yields the same monotone relationship 
between uncertainty and the likelihood of success. Moreover, the same is true if 
we ignore xso and focus on xp, similar to Shavell. In each of the forty scenarios 
reflecting symmetric distributions128 the same result holds: lower uncertainty 
leads to greater compliance. Notably, this is true regardless of the location of 
the distribution’s mean in the [0,1] range. 
There are two important caveats to this strong claim. First, sometimes a 
change in uncertainty may not matter. If, for example, an actor chooses to 
abstain from taking an uncertain position, a change in uncertainty may make 
the actor even less likely to act.129 Second, in some of C&C’s scenarios (nine 
out of forty), the monotone relationship between uncertainty and compliance 
does not hold for the entire range of uncertainty they study. However, in each 
case where this relationship reverses, a normal distribution is not a plausible 
representation of legal uncertainty. In those cases, the level of uncertainty 
producing the reversal is so high that the lowest and/or highest values of F(x) 
are not close to zero or one.130 This means that even outright evasion leads to a 
significant likelihood of success (recall that perfect detection is assumed), and 
even perfect compliance results in a significant probability of being viewed as 
illegal. In contrast, both the frequentist and the subjectivist understandings of 
legal uncertainty demand that the relevant probability varies from zero to one 
within the uncertain range. 131  Thus, we should take C&C’s scenarios 
incorporating the F(x) curve that does not start close to zero and/or does not 
 
128. These are C&C’s Tables 1-5 with eight columns per table. See Calfee & 
Craswell, supra note 1. By symmetric, I mean non-skewed. 
129. Furthermore, extending C&C’s simulations to distributions with means closer to 
the ends of the [0,1] range yields scenarios where the change in uncertainty does not affect the location 
of x* even when actors choose to take uncertain positions. In those additional simulations, x* is 
determined wholly by the cost and benefit functions that C&C chose for their examples. 
130. Rather, F(x) corresponding to no effort to comply ranges from 8% to over 20%, 
increasing to over 30% as the standard deviation reaches 1,000. 
131. Relatedly, an F(x) function that does not start at 0 and end at 1 fails to satisfy the 
basic requirements of a cumulative distribution function. See supra note 83. 
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end close to one with great caution.132 In all instances where this problem does 
not arise, lower uncertainty leads to greater compliance in C&C’s 
specifications.133 
One may wonder if this outcome is due to some peculiarity of a normal 
distribution. It is not. Re-running one of C&C’s scenarios 134  using three 
plausible alternative distributions—Logistic, Cauchy, and Triangular—makes 
no difference.135 All these simulations produce the results similar to those 
shown in Table 1: the relationship between uncertainty and x* is sometimes 
non-monotone but lower uncertainty always leads to greater compliance. 
The model offered in this Article yields the same relationship as well. 
Figure 2 offers a graphical illustration. Panel A presents three increasingly 
certain density functions (the tighter the bell curve, the more certain is the 
function) and a linear marginal cost line. Following Table 1, all distributions 
are centered on 0.5. The privately optimal values of x* correspond to intercepts 
between the marginal cost line and each density function that lies to the right of 
that function’s peak.136 These intercepts are marked as low, medium, and high, 
reflecting the levels of uncertainty. The accompanying numbers in callout 
boxes are the precise values of the respective x*. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132. This is an important caveat because contemporary economic research building on 
C&C’s analysis continues to study legal uncertainty using distributions with excessively high degrees of 
variance. See Hoeppner & Lyhs, supra note 71. 
133. I was unable to replicate C&C’s results for a skewed (not normal) distribution, 
see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 291 tbl.6, because I could not guess the three parameters 
underlying the distribution. 
134. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 288 tbl.3 (the column with the mean 
value of 500). I chose Table 3 for no particular reason, other than that the benefit and loss functions 
modeled in Table 3 are appealingly simple and, therefore, transparent. 
135. These distributions are plausible because (i) they are continuous, (ii) they are 
single-peaked, (iii) they may have a mean other than zero (Student’s T distribution, for instance, always 
has a zero mean), (iv) they produce (in their pure or truncated form) S-shaped F(x) functions on the [0,1] 
range for various levels of uncertainty, and (v) they are defined by their parameters in such a way that 
varying one of the parameters changes the dispersion of the distribution without changing its mean 
(something that is not possible, for instance, for Beta, Gamma, Chi, and some other distributions). 
136. Panel A is a graphical illustration of the first-order condition for the gain 
function. The second order condition is 𝐺′′(𝑥) = 𝑓′(𝑥), and it is negative (corresponds to a maximum 
G(x)) where f(x) is declining (i.e., to the right of the peak)). 
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Figure 2: The Effect of a Change in Uncertainty on the Probability of Success 
Function 
 
  
 
As is clear from Panel A, a decrease in uncertainty from high to medium 
moves x* to the right (from 0.58 to 0.6), while a further decrease from medium 
to low moves x* to the left (from 0.6 to 0.55). This reflects the complicated 
relationship between uncertainty and x* revealed in C&C’s simulations. Panel 
B tells a different story. It shows the familiar S-shaped curves, with steeper 
lines corresponding to tighter, less uncertain probability distributions. Again, a 
decrease in uncertainty shifts x* first to the right and then to the left, reflecting 
the shifts depicted in Panel A. But in contrast with Panel A, each shift leads to 
an increase in the optimal probability of success F(x*). The numbers in the 
low/med/high boxes restate the respective optimal compliance efforts x* and 
add the corresponding values of F(x*). Clearly, the probability of success 
increases monotonically as uncertainty declines. 
The complex relationship between uncertainty and the compliance effort 
is not inevitable. One can easily produce simulations where a decrease in 
uncertainty leads to smaller values of x* (always moves x* to the left) and 
higher values of F(x*). The important point, however, is that whatever the 
relationship is between uncertainty and x*, lower uncertainty appears to lead to 
more conservative, higher probability of success positions. For those interested 
in legal compliance, this is a significant finding. A natural question to ask next 
is what this means for private actors. 
B. Legal Uncertainty and Private Gains 
Rational, risk-neutral actors care about their gains. How do these gains 
change when a legal standard becomes more rule-like? Figure 3 suggests the 
answer. It depicts the same S-shaped curves that appear in Figure 2, adds a 
linear marginal cost curve (the downward sloping dashed line reflecting the 
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cost function depicted in Figure 2, Panel A137), and presents the gain curves 
resulting from subtracting that cost from each of the three expected benefits 
bFi(x). 
The relationship between private gains and uncertainty is not hard to see. 
Even in this case where the optimal compliance effort x* changes non-
monotonically as uncertainty decreases, greater certainty leads to greater gains. 
 
Figure 3: The Effect of a Change in Uncertainty on the Gain Function 
 
 
 
This is not an obvious result when the relationship between x* and 
uncertainty is not monotone. As just discussed, 𝑥!∗  is greater than 𝑥!∗ . This 
means that C(𝑥!∗ ) is higher than C(𝑥!∗ ). Nevertheless, the benefit of greater 
certainty (a steeper F2 compared to F1) exceeds the additional cost of moving 
from 𝑥!∗  to 𝑥!∗ , resulting in a higher peak of the G2 curve compared to G1. When 
the relationship between the compliance effort and the uncertainty level is 
monotone, the same result is obvious. Lower uncertainty leads to both less 
costly compliance efforts and higher expected benefits due to steeper S-shaped 
curves. Both effects increase the maximum gain. 
C&C’s simulations produce similar results. Out of forty scenarios that 
they study, only two138 reveal a non-monotone relationship between gains and 
 
137. The cost curve in Figure 3 is curved, while it is straight in Figure 2, Panel A, 
because the curves in Figure 2, Panel A (both the cost curve and the probability curves) reflect functions 
that are first derivatives of the functions that produce the cost and the S-shaped probability curves in 
Figure 3. 
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uncertainty for the levels of uncertainty where a normal distribution is 
appropriate. An almost complete match in the relationship between gains and 
uncertainty in C&C’s simulations and the ones original to this Article suggests 
that this relationship is fairly robust. 
The strong (even if not universal) correspondence between uncertainty 
and private gains may explain a phenomenon widely observed in legal practice: 
lawyers and their clients often complain about legal uncertainty. Even 
sophisticated actors such as large firms and their representatives lobby 
constantly to clarify, specify, and narrow the rules. Whether in tax, 139 
environmental regulation,140 or financial regulation,141 sophisticated actors tend 
to prefer rules to standards; that is, they want greater certainty. The model 
explains why this preference is rational even for risk-neutral parties: greater 
certainty likely means larger private gains. 
C. Legal Uncertainty from the Government’s Perspective 
What about the government’s perspective? Should the government prefer 
more certainty or less? To answer this question, we need to specify the 
government’s objective. The dominant economic view of what this objective 
ought to be is well-known—it is social welfare maximization. C&C’s analysis 
adopts this view, and Shavell’s study of uncertainty does the same implicitly. 
This Article, in contrast, seeks to analyze many existing legal standards 
that may not be plausibly assumed to be welfare maximizing even 
approximately. The optimal deterrence theory is not particularly helpful or 
 
138. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1, at 288 tbl.3 (the columns with the mean 
value of 350 and 400). 
139. See, e.g., Kristen A. Parillo, Businesses Would Pay More Taxes for More 
Certainty, Survey Says, 148 TAX NOTES 1069, 1069 (2015) (summarizing a Grant Thornton survey of 
2,580 businesses in 35 jurisdictions revealing that “three-quarters of companies would support paying 
more taxes in exchange for greater clarity from tax authorities regarding what constitutes acceptable tax 
planning”); Susan P. Serota, Economic Substance Codification: ABA Has “Substantial Reservations,” 
115 TAX NOTES 389, 392 (2007) (reporting comments from the ABA Tax Section urging Congress to 
eliminate a provision in the proposed legislation that would create “an entirely new and uncertain 
requirement on a wide range of transactions”); Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule Produces 
Anticlimactic Hearing, 64 TAX NOTES 558 (1994) (summarizing sharp disagreements, including within 
the tax bar, about the cost of uncertainty created by the proposed antiabuse regulations). 
140. See, e.g., Scott C. Whitney & John S. Donnellon, Lender Liability Under 
Superfund After Fleet Factors: An Evaluation of Proposed Corrective Action, 1 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 13 (1991) (describing complaints of the American Banking Association about the uncertainty 
created by a judicial precedent and the costs of that uncertainty for the lending industry). 
141. See, e.g., David Lucking & Aravind Vinod, A Confused Industry: Uncertainty 
Regarding Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank Leaves Foreign Swap Dealers in Legal Limbo, 
30 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 64, 64-65 (2011) (“Non-US financial institutions are undoubtedly bemused by the 
lack of clarity around the Dodd-Frank Act’s extraterritorial application.”); Michael Wiseman & Andrew 
Gladin, Dodd-Frank, Basel III and the Age of Uncertainty, BANKDIRECTOR.COM (2012), 
http://www.bankdirector.com/index.php/issues/legal/dodd-frank-basel-iii-and-the-age-of-uncertainty/ 
(arguing that legal uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act “creates real risks 
for financial markets and the U.S. and global economy”). 
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relevant for policymakers evaluating these real-life, imperfect, uncertain 
standards. Two alternatives suggest themselves. 
The first one comes from the law and economics of contracts. The 
conventional assumption in that literature is that the overall efficiency may be 
approximated by focusing on private gains of the contracting parties.142 The 
same approach has been used in corporate governance scholarship. There, the 
social optimum is assumed to coincide with the maximum joint gain of 
shareholders and managers.143 Equating overall efficiency with private gains is 
plausible if externalities and other market failures are unlikely, as may be true 
in some settings. It is less plausible for government regulation generally. At the 
same time, if the law is inefficient, externalities themselves may not be welfare-
reducing.144 In any case, in the absence of welfare-maximizing rules, private 
gains offer policymakers a useful evaluative criterion. 
Another plausible goal that government actors may pursue is compliance. 
As already discussed, regulators clearly care about it; they prefer more 
compliance to less; they tend to disfavor positions that are more likely to be 
wrong than right; and they particularly dislike positions that have a very small 
chance of success.145 All of this seems to suggest that if maximizing social 
welfare is not a realistic objective, maximizing compliance is an appealing 
alternative. It seems simple, intuitive, and more reflective of the real world than 
either welfare or private gain maximization. 
A moment’s reflection reveals, however, that compliance maximization is 
not what regulators want. Even though they generally prefer greater 
compliance, they do not require perfection. For instance, Congress could have 
required a transfer of “all” assets, rather than “substantially all,”146 in order to 
capture a tax benefit. Or it could have designated a fixed percentage of assets 
and penalized any company that failed to comply fully. The Supreme Court 
could have demanded that a governmental unit explains its permitting decisions 
“contemporaneously,” rather than “essentially contemporaneously.”147 Or the 
Court could have specified a precise number of days as a condition of 
sustaining the permitting decision. Why do regulators enact vague standards 
that all but invite less-than-full compliance, and then object when compliance is 
not close to perfect? 
 
142. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal 
Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1082 (1995) (referring to “‘efficiency-
minded’ lawmakers [who] might pursue the narrow goal of maximizing gains from trade”); Benjamin E. 
Hermalin, Avery Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 
13 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
143. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-Termism and Long-Termism 11 
(Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 526, 2016). 
144. See supra note 30. 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 107-117. 
146. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
147. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015). 
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This Article does not develop a theory of enforcement of uncertain legal 
commands. The rules-versus-standards literature that explains why both types 
of commands exist is well known.148  Its basic idea is that standards are 
preferable when the policymaker is uncertain where to draw the line and it is 
costly to resolve this uncertainty ex ante.149 When this happens, ex post case-
by-case interpretations both assure appropriate results in individual cases and 
gradually convert a vague standard into a clear rule. Notably, if we think of the 
latter process as a convergence of a distribution toward the mean, a regulator 
should be indifferent about whether any particular interpretation exceeds or 
falls short of that mean. After all, a standard will become a rule over time no 
matter where individual interpretations happen to fall along the way. 
Yet this indifferent attitude is clearly not what lawmakers reveal when 
they insist on “more likely than not” or stronger positions even when these 
positions are observed by the regulators,150 or when they impose penalties on 
positions with particularly low chances of success.151 So while the rules-versus-
standards framework explains why lawmakers enact standards in the first place, 
it does not explain lawmakers’ observed preference for more compliant 
positions after the standard is put in place. 
One possible explanation reflects multiple levels of regulatory authority. 
Congress enacted the “substantially all” test, but the IRS needs to administer it. 
For obvious reasons, courts would not allow the IRS to interpret “substantially 
all” as “all” (or as “nothing,” for that matter), so the agency must accept 
compliance efforts lower than x=1 (and higher than x=0) even it prefers these 
efforts to be as high (low) as possible. This explanation, however, does not 
illuminate the preference for high but not certain compliance of Congress itself. 
Perhaps it is related to enforcement costs, or political economy considerations, 
or confusion between welfare-maximizing laws and those that are not, or some 
other reason. A model explaining this preference would be a great contribution 
to the literature. Unfortunately, it does not appear to exist. Thus, this Article’s 
compliance-focused analysis takes the regulators’ preferences as they are. 
Regulators clearly care about the probability of success; they often prefer this 
probability to exceed 50%, but they do not demand perfect certainty. 
To be clear, this discussion does not establish that more compliant 
positions are better for the society than less compliant ones. Nor does it 
demonstrate that any particular probability of success is socially optimal, most 
fair, or otherwise preferable. 
 
148. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
149. See id. at 569. 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 113-117. 
151. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (imposing a penalty on positions 
found to be incorrect by a court if the positions are not supported by a “reasonable basis”—a threshold 
significantly below the fifty-fifty level of confidence). 
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But the discussion does suggest a way of evaluating the consequences of 
legal uncertainty from the government perspective. We can do so by asking 
whether, given regulators’ revealed preferences, some of the government’s 
views and enforcement strategies are inconsistent with the government’s 
compliance-oriented objectives. More specifically, we can identify mistakes in 
the regulators’ understanding of the relationship between legal uncertainty and 
probabilistic compliance. We can also highlight the consequences of 
government’s action (or inaction) following the enactment of vague standards. 
The following two sections take on these tasks in turn. 
D. Government’s Confusion About the In Terrorem Effect 
Uncertain legal commands are pervasive, their promulgators and enforcers 
heterogeneous. So one should be cautious with generalizations. It is fair to say, 
however, that many regulators believe that legal uncertainty has a desirable in 
terrorem effect. Regulated parties, this view suggests, are reluctant to take 
aggressive, low likelihood of success positions if they are unsure of what is 
legal and what is not. Greater legal certainty, in contrast, emboldens private 
actors to be more aggressive.152 
Government agencies have expressed this view.153 Legal advisors and 
commentators have stated it.154 And even the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed 
with it.155 One way a regulator may exacerbate the in terrorem effect is by 
withholding authoritative guidance that would clarify vague standards. The 
 
152. Anecdotal support for this view is not difficult to find. See, e.g., Marie Sapirie, 
The Evolution of Inversions, 148 TAX NOTES 611, 613 (2015) (citing a corporate tax expert’s view that 
“[w]hen you have the [standard] that has a lot of gray areas, you can’t risk being right at the line”). 
153. See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, Tax Administration in the 90s: The New “Reign of 
Terror,” 74 TAXES 227, 234 (1996) (stating that “[t]here have been a number of instances in which the 
IRS has indicated its intention to use in terrorem rules as the basis for tax regulation,” such as in the 
partnership area). 
154 . See Marvin Chirelstein, Learned Hand’s Contribution to the Law of Tax 
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 459 (1968) (referring to the in terrorem effect of uncertain rules); Michael 
S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm 
Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 900-01 (2004) (“The 
uncertainty created by the vague language of the provision and the lack of guidance generates an in 
terrorem chilling effect on U.S. citizens considering expatriation.”); Martin J. McMahon, Reflections on 
the Regulations Process: “Do the Regulations Have To Be Complex” or “Is Hyperlexis the Manna of 
the Tax Bar?,” 51 TAX NOTES 1441, 1446 (1991) (“Finally, where the object of a particular provision is 
to protect the fisc against abusive transactions, consideration should be given to the potential in terrorem 
value of vague general rules, even though they produce planning complexity.”) (emphasis added). 
155. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967) (explaining that “[t]he 
very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a highly 
efficient in terrorem mechanism”); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) (“[A] person who 
contemplates protected activity might be discouraged by the in terrorem effect of the statute. Indeed, 
such a person might choose not to speak because of uncertainty whether his claim of privilege would 
prevail if challenged.”); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (noting that 
“[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked’”) (alteration in original). 
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IRS, 156  the Food and Drug Administration, 157  and even State Bar 
Associations158 have all relied on this strategy. Another in terrorem tactic is to 
issue warnings about possible future punitive guidance.159 
The model offered here explains the likely intuition underlying the in 
terrorem view of legal uncertainty. It also demonstrates why this intuition is 
wrong. 
The origin of this intuition is obvious from Figure 2. A decrease in 
uncertainty from moderate to low induces a downward shift in x* from 0.6 to 
0.55. Such shifts seem undesirable to regulators. The lower the compliance 
effort, their intuition suggests, the lower the probability of success. The fewer 
assets the company transfers under the “substantially all” test, the more 
aggressive is the transaction. 
This link between the compliance effort x* and the probability of success 
F(x*) is understandable, but mistaken. The link is understandable because it 
does indeed exist if the level of uncertainty is constant. But if uncertainty 
changes, the analysis changes as well.160 When the downward shift in x* results 
from a change in uncertainty, we cannot assume that a lower effort corresponds 
to a lower likelihood of success. Rather, we need to investigate how a change in 
uncertainty affects the probability of success directly. And as we now know 
from Section II.A, this probability generally increases with greater certainty 
even if the compliance effort declines. 
The case should not be overstated. The results just discussed come from 
simulations. They hold if actors take uncertain positions in excess of fifty-fifty. 
 
156 . See, e.g., Kimberly S. Blanchard, Guidance Needed for CFC Lending 
Transactions, 126 TAX NOTES 201, 202 (2010) (describing how the IRS’s refusal to issue guidance has 
an in terrorem effect on taxpayers and their counsel); Kirsch, supra note 154 (mentioning the lack of 
guidance). 
157. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without 
Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 533 (2015) (observing that “legal uncertainty created by the 
lack of [FDA] regulations . . . produces an in terrorem effect sufficient to generate large settlements”). 
158. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 
YALE L.J. 491, 517-18 (1985) (explaining that the lack of published guidelines for “character and 
fitness” investigations of applicants to State Bars, combined with the absence of advance rulings by 
character committees, leads to great uncertainty and many negative consequences for would-be 
lawyers). 
159. See, e.g., Kimberly S. Blanchard, Extensive New Anti-Inversion Rules Issued, 145 
TAX NOTES 89, 91-92 (2014) (referring to the in terrorem effect of the IRS warning that if the Service 
“can figure out that it has colorable authority to write [interest-stripping] rules,” they will do so in the 
future to deter inversions); Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of REMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 
149, 245 (1994) (arguing that the IRS’s “ominous rumblings . . . created a fair amount of confusion and 
uncertainty in the marketplace . . . and no doubt this in terrorem effect was intended”) (emphasis added). 
160. As we have seen, a decline in uncertainty (say a shift from F1 to F2 to F3 in 
Figure 2) may lead to a decline in the compliance effort x*. Even when x* increases (as it does from 𝑥!∗  to 𝑥!∗ ), that increase is unstable. Eventually, greater certainty leads to a lower compliance effort, assuming 
the original effort exceeded xp. For example, privately optimal compliance efforts in Figures 2 and 3 
range from 0.55 to 0.6. Imagine that the law becomes perfectly certain, and the line separating legal and 
illegal conduct is precisely 0.5 (the mean of uncertain distributions in Figures 2 and 3). Whether an actor 
started at 0.55, 0.58, or 0.6, the actor will now choose the effort just above 0.5—he will reduce his 
compliance effort. 
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Even so, the results are useful. The government may often observe whether 
positions exceed the fifty-fifty threshold, and they are likely to do so in any 
event.161 And although simulations do not supply irrefutable proof that lower 
uncertainty leads to greater compliance, they show that very often it does. 
Moreover, the simulations demonstrate convincingly that a reduction of 
compliance efforts in response to lower uncertainty does not necessarily mean 
more aggressive, less compliant behavior. Thus, higher compliance efforts in 
response to greater in terrorem uncertainty are nothing for the government to 
celebrate. 
This discussion sheds further light on the two evaluative criteria suggested 
above: xp and F(x). It must now be clear that the latter is not just superior, but is 
far superior to the former. xp is useful as a rough indicator of whether any 
particular x* is more likely to be legal or illegal. But xp is a poor guide 
otherwise. Assessing private actors’ compliance efforts by reference to xp may 
seriously mislead policymakers because it restricts their attention to compliance 
efforts. Rather, only by considering the values of F(x) can regulators appraise 
the effect of a change in uncertainty—whether on private gains or on 
probabilistic compliance. The model demonstrates that if policymakers care 
about either, greater certainty should often be the government’s goal. 
Thus, the DOJ and the FTC were probably wise to develop a rigorous 
methodology for defining relevant product markets rather than relying on a 
vague “effective competition” standard.162 In contrast, the IRS was likely ill-
advised to replace a relatively clear definition of “substantial business 
activities” in its first set of anti-inversion regulations with a vaguer test. In 
contrast, the tax agency enhanced taxpayer compliance when it replaced that 
test with a clear bright-line rule.163 
More generally, if a regulator observes private actors’ responses to a 
vague standard, and if a less uncertain standard would satisfy the regulator’s 
preferences, the regulator should clarify the standard to increase compliance. 
Of course, if a regulator is unsure how to narrow a standard, the regulator 
should keep the law vague. In other words, the argument here is only against 
uncertainty for uncertainty’s sake. 
E. Legal Uncertainty and the Market for Legal Advice 
There exists yet another reason for the government to value legal 
certainty. That reason emerges when we consider the market for legal advice. 
This market involves sophisticated parties and privileged communications. 
Thus, the following discussion is somewhat speculative and is based on 
personal experience in private practice and conversations with numerous legal 
 
161. As discussed in Section II.F, infra, this is the most likely outcome when a 
regulator observes the choice of x. 
162. See supra note 35. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. 
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experts. Those familiar with this market may decide for themselves whether the 
concerns described below ring true. 
Until now, we have implicitly assumed that any change in uncertainty is 
due to government action. An administrative agency may issue guidance 
interpreting a vague standard, or a court may narrow the range of the standard’s 
possible meanings. However, the law may appear to become more certain to 
regulated parties for a very different reason. As legal advisors grapple with 
ambiguous terms, and as they interact with each other, they may (and often do) 
become increasingly confident in their interpretations of uncertain legal 
provisions even in the absence of any authoritative guidance. The perceived 
uncertainty declines without any change in the content of the law. Numerous 
“rules of thumb” that have emerged in securities regulation,164 tax,165 and 
antitrust enforcement,166 among others, are all examples of this process. 
This perceived decline is likely to induce rational actors to shift toward 
the smaller values of x* as discussed in Section II.A.167 Notably, this will 
happen even if legal advisors interpret the vague standard correctly on average, 
that is, if the mean of the single-peak density function reflecting legal 
uncertainty remains the same. The perceived tightening of this distribution 
alone will often lead to lower compliance efforts. 
In terms of the model, the F(x) distribution will remain unchanged while 
the compliance effort x* will decline. This will yield weaker, more aggressive 
positions. Moreover, because greater certainty tends to lead to higher private 
gains, an increase in perceived certainty will induce some actors who 
previously abstained from acting altogether to go forward with uncertain 
transactions. Because the actual uncertainty has not diminished, these 
transactions are unlikely to reflect high probability of success.168 None of this 
would make law enforcers happy. 
 
164. For an example of the rule of thumb interpreting “materiality” of financial 
misstatements to mean 5% to 10%  of annual income, see Interim Report of the Committee on Capital 
Market Regulation, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG. 128 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf. 
165. For several examples of how informal market-practice rules of thumb emerged in 
response vague tax standards, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit 
Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 614-18 (2007). 
166. For instance, the “small but significant and nontransitory increase in price” test 
established by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is generally interpreted to mean “5-10 percent price 
increase lasting one year or longer.” Wegener, supra note 35, at 156. 
167. A shift to higher values of x* is also possible, though unstable. See supra note 
160. 
168. Consider an actor, call him X, who is very similar to the actor described in Figure 
3, except that X’s compliance cost is slightly higher than those of that actor. As a result, the tip of the G1 
curve for X is just below zero and he abstains from acting. If X perceives that uncertainty has decreased 
to a point where it is reflected by the steep curve F3(x), X’s gain becomes positive (similar to the top of 
the G3 curve) and he takes an uncertain position with compliance effort similar to 𝑥!∗ = 0.55. If F3(x) 
was the true level of uncertainty, that compliance effort would lead to a position that is 98% likely to be 
correct. However, because the F1(x) remains the relevant curve, the same compliance effort corresponds 
to a much lower 63% probability of success. 
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Another common trend among legal advisors should make regulators even 
more concerned: these advisors are likely to view an uncertain legal standard as 
more and more forgiving. To see why, consider first what happens if the 
government gradually relaxes a legal standard. In terms of the model, the 
spread of the distribution (the steepness of the F(x) function) stays the same, 
but xp shifts downward. The obvious consequence of this shift is a shift of x* in 
the same direction: A less demanding legal standard would lead rational actors 
to reduce their compliance effort. A slightly less obvious implication is that a 
decrease in xp leads to greater gains. This may induce some actors who were 
unwilling to engage in transactions facing a costlier standard (higher xp) to go 
forward with the deal if the standard is easier to satisfy. Figure 4 reflects these 
considerations, holding all other parameters constant.169 
 
Figure 4: The Effect of a Change in the Legal Standard on the Gain Function 
 
 
 
The trend depicted in Figure 4 is unobjectionable as long as the reduction 
in xp is due to new information from the authoritative interpreter of the law. 
However, a decrease in xp may have a very different explanation. 
When legal advisors face a new uncertain provision, they adopt a 
particular interpretation and proceed with advice. Because any interpretation 
other than xp=0 forces clients to incur a cost, clients pressure their advisors to 
 
169. Specifically, as xp declines from 0.7 to 0.3, the peak of the gain curve also shifts 
to the right (that is, x* declines). In addition, maximum gains are higher for lower values of xp. 
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interpret the standard in the least costly way. If regulators remain silent, this 
pressure produces a one-way ratchet. 
For instance, lawyers begin by issuing “should” opinions stating that 80% 
satisfies the “substantially all” test. Some transactions go forward based on 
these opinions. If the regulator does not challenge these transactions, legal 
advisors assume that 80% satisfies the standard for sure.170 They begin to issue 
stronger “will” opinions to clients willing to transfer 80% of the assets, and 
“should” opinions to clients transferring less than that. Thus, the prevailing 
interpretation of “substantially all” shifts toward less costly positions. 
In the model’s terms, this means a shift in the perceived distribution 
toward the lower values of xp, with a corresponding shift in the values of x*. But 
the actual distribution remains the same because the law has not changed since 
the enactment of the standard. Thus, a downward shift in x* produces much 
more aggressive positions. Using Figure 4 as an example, a shift from the 
actual legal standard reflected (let us assume) by the probability of success 
curve F2, to a perceived standard reflected by the curve F3 reduces the 
probability of success of the client’s position from 91% to 19%.171 Generally, 
more actors take uncertain positions, and these positions become more 
aggressive. As with a decrease in the perceived uncertainty, this perceived 
relaxation of a legal standard undermines compliance. 
The remedy for both problems is the same: the government should either 
clarify uncertain provisions or counter the false perceptions—be it a perception 
of an increased certainty or of increasingly lenient standards—that are likely to 
result from the market for legal advice.172 
Examples of regulators using all these approaches are not hard to find. 
The IRS officials, for instance, occasionally remind practitioners that the 
government does not recognize the so-called “Wall Street Rule.”173 Similarly, 
the SEC made a point of reiterating that it does not subscribe to the “rule of 
thumb” definition of “materiality” for the purposes of financial 
misstatements.174 And even though the Horizontal Merger Guidelines implicitly 
 
170. They do so rather than assuming, for example, that the resource-constrained 
regulator has not had a chance to consider the issue. 
171. That is, 𝑥!∗ = 0.43, corresponding to the peak of the 𝐺! curve, produces the value 
of 𝐹!  of only 0.19. This, of course, is a rather extreme example. 
172. An unstated assumption in this Section’s discussion is that the private actor’s 
interpretation of an uncertain standard does not influence the government’s own interpretation of it. One 
can imagine situations where this assumption would not hold, that is, where market practice affects or 
even constrains the government’s interpretation. 
173. See Sam Young & Lee Sheppard, Korb Slams Textron Ruling, Wall Street Rule, 
117 TAX NOTES 204 (2007). According to one IRS official, the “Wall Street Rule” states that “the IRS 
can’t attack the tax treatment of a transaction if there is a long-standing and generally accepted 
understanding of its expected tax treatment.” Heather Bennett, Parker Debunks “Wall Street Rule,” 
Pushes LTR Preconferences, 100 TAX NOTES 1634, 1634 (2003). 
174. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 
19, 1999) (reminding practitioners that the term “material” may not be interpreted to exclude a 
“misstatement or omission of an item that falls under a 5% threshold,” as “one rule of thumb in 
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recognize the “5-10 percent price increase for one year or longer”175 rule of 
thumb, they are quite clear that these percentages are not set in stone.176 In all 
these and similar cases, the government regulators insisted—wisely—that 
vague legal provisions do not become more certain or more lenient over time 
merely because practitioners repeatedly interpret them in a particular way. A 
regulator may also counter the negative compliance effects of the market for 
legal advice by converting an uncertain standard into a clear rule, as the IRS 
did in its third and most recent set of anti-inversion regulations.177 
F. The Likely Range of Compliance Efforts 
Some of the conclusions discussed above rely on the assumption that 
rational agents whose compliance efforts are observed by a regulator are likely 
to choose compliance efforts greater than xp. Why would this be the case? 
The most general assumption about the shape of legal uncertainty made 
here is that the density function has a single peak. Given this assumption, it is 
theoretically possible that rational actors take uncertain positions either 
exceeding or falling short of xp. The latter outcome, however, appears to have a 
limited significance. In fact, it is difficult to identify a set of parameters that 
would produce this result under this Article’s model with a normally distributed 
legal uncertainty bound by a [0,1] interval. 
This outcome is consistent with both C&C’s and Shavell’s findings. 
Shavell concludes that legal uncertainty induces actors to take more than due 
care as long as the distribution is not “too dispersed.”178 If the distribution 
representing legal uncertainty is single-peaked and symmetric, this means that 
compliance efforts will exceed xp if uncertainty is not too high. C&C’s 
simulations illustrate what “too dispersed” may mean. Many of their results 
yield over-deterrence (equivalent to x* above xp in the present specification), 
confirming this Section’s conclusion. Some C&C’s simulations reveal under-
deterrence. However, almost all of the under-deterrence results arise from 
unrealistically high levels of uncertainty. 179  If we focus only on C&C’s 
simulations where this problem does not arise, the vast majority of their results 
 
particular suggests”); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1346 (2002) (describing the customary rule of thumb). 
175. Wegener, supra note 35, at 146. 
176. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 8-10 (2010) (emphasizing that the FTC and DOJ may “use a price increase that is larger or 
smaller than five percent” as “small but significant” in defining the relevant product market). 
177. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3 (adopting a highly specific test based on several clear 
numerical thresholds to enable taxpayers to interpret the term “substantial business activities” for 
acquisitions completed on or after June 3, 2015). 
178. SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 97. 
179. I mean “unrealistically high” in the sense discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 130-131. To illustrate, consider the point in Table 1 where greater uncertainty begins to produce 
under-deterrence (in this model’s terms, x* drops below xp). This point corresponds to the standard 
deviation of 400. Notably, the probability of success curve reflecting this standard deviation starts at 
10.6%. A normal distribution is not a plausible representation of legal uncertainty in this case. 
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correspond to agents taking better than fifty-fifty positions in terms of this 
Article’s framework. 
Finally, the conclusion that private parties tend to take better than more-
likely-than-not positions is supported by real-life observations. For instance, 
corporate reorganizations involving public companies often involve legal 
uncertainty regarding their tax-free status. These reorganizations also face 
inevitable scrutiny by the IRS. Companies routinely request their law firms to 
deliver legal opinions supporting the tax-free nature of the deals.180 The degree 
of confidence that shareholders demand in this context is typically either a 
“will” or a “should” level.181 The former amounts to something like an 85%-
95% probability of success (0.85<F(x)<0.95); the latter to a 65%-85% 
probability (0.65<F(x)<0.85). At the same time, public companies rarely, if 
ever, proceed with transactions when their lawyers can only deliver a “more 
likely than not” (F(x) just in excess of 0.5) or a “substantial authority” 
(0.3<F(x)<0.5) opinion.182 These observations are consistent with the range of 
compliance efforts suggested by this Article’s model. They are also consistent 
with C&C’s analysis to a greater extent than it would appear from observing 
C&C’s reported simulation results. In a vast majority of simulations, the 
privately optimal compliance effort x* indeed exceeds xp, and the resulting 
probability of success exceeds 50%. 
G. The Effects of Uncertain Detection 
Until this point, the discussion assumed that every uncertain position or 
transaction is scrutinized by the relevant authority. Needless to say, this is not 
always the case. For every high-profile tax-free deal guaranteed to attract 
attention from the IRS, there are numerous transactions that are unlikely to be 
audited or identified on audit. For every merger subject to a clearance by the 
FTC and the DOJ, there are many more potentially anti-competitive acts that 
are all but certain to escape the regulator’s gaze. All of this is well known in 
law and economics. In fact, detection uncertainty has been the focus of the 
economic analysis of law enforcement since its inception.183 
Modeling detection uncertainty in the presence of legal uncertainty is 
straightforward, at least in the first approximation.184 Detection uncertainty 
 
180. See, e.g., Williams Corp., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 2016 WL 
3576682 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2016) (proposed merger requiring a “should” opinion about the merger’s tax 
consequences as a condition to closing). 
181. See id.; see also Aabaco Holdings, 2015 Preliminary Information Statement 
(Exhibit 99.10) 45 (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1646775/000119312515378561/d77711dex991.htm (describing 
a “will” opinion from the company’s tax counsel in support of a tax-free spinoff). 
182. See Raby & Raby, supra note 108. 
183. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 412-13 (summarizing the literature). 
184. I do not address here the possibility that detection and legal uncertainty may be 
interrelated. Such interrelationship is possible, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The 
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means that an actor may capture the benefit b no matter how implausible his 
legal position is if the regulator does not observe the position. The most 
important implication of introducing detection uncertainty is clear from Figure 
5. When the likelihood of detection p is sufficiently low,185 an incentive to 
incur any cost of taking an uncertain legal position disappears.186 The specifics 
depend on the model parameters, but there is little doubt that if the likelihood 
of detection falls below, say, 10% (curve G3), the model predicts that rational 
actors will simply evade the law. 
 
Figure 5: The Effect of a Change in the Probability of Detection on the Gain 
Function 
 
 
 
This result is well-known in the models that posit a world without legal 
uncertainty. The point here is that introducing legal uncertainty does not change 
the effects of uncertain detection. 
The standard response to the imperfect detection problem is also well-
known—the so-called penalty multiplier. If the penalty is based on the benefit 
 
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1998), but not inevitable, see 
Raskolnikov, supra note 62, at 1039. 
185. More precisely, p is the probability that a legally uncertain position will be 
scrutinized (for example, both audited and detected on audit). I treat this probability as exogenous, but 
this is not always the case. See Yitzhaki, supra note 68. 
186 . The algebraic form of the gain functions depicted in Figure 5 is   𝐺(𝑥) = (1 − 𝑝)(𝑏 − 𝐶(𝑥)) +   𝑝(𝑏𝐹(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥)) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑏   +   𝑝𝑏𝐹(𝑥)   −   𝐶(𝑥). In other words, by 
taking a position xi, the actor incurs the cost of C(xi) (the last term), captures the gain of b if the position 
is not scrutinized (the first term), and obtains the gain of bF(x) otherwise (the second term). 
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derived by the actor and includes this benefit, the multiplier equals !!!! .187 
Adding a penalty based on this multiplier to the gain function depicted in 
Figure 5 eliminates the effect of uncertain detection.188 In other words, the 
standard multiplier “works” in the presence of legal uncertainty as it does in its 
absence. So if a policymaker prefers more compliance to less, a detection-based 
multiplier is a good idea. 
This conclusion begs the question. Should the two types of uncertainty be 
treated the same? Should the multiplier offset only detection uncertainty, or 
legal uncertainty as well? C&C assume that a multiplier should be set to 
reverse the effects of all uncertainty, including the legal one,189 and there 
appear to be no contrary arguments in the literature. 
This conclusion makes sense in the optimal deterrence framework. 
Reversing the effects of uncertain liability for external harms makes them 
certain in expectation, forcing actors to take full account of the harms they 
produce. In the expected value terms, this converts a threshold-based regime 
(such as the “reasonable person” standard190) into a strict liability regime. As is 
well-known, both strict liability and threshold-based regimes such as 
negligence may be socially optimal.191 
Although social optimality is irrelevant in the probabilistic compliance 
framework, incentives still matter. Reversing the effect of legal uncertainty 
means imposing a penalty that would offset the entire expected benefit from 
taking an uncertain position, no matter how strong that position happens to 
be.192 Just as the detection-related multiplier makes a private actor feel like a 
 
187 . See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and 
Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1430 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin 
Feldstein eds., 2002); Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. 
PUB. ECON. 201, 201 (1974). 
188. To reflect the multiplier-based penalty, we would add a new term to the equation 
in footnote 186. It would reflect that if the uncertain position is detected (with probability p) and legal 
uncertainty is resolved against the actor (with probability (1-F(x))), the actor will pay a penalty equal to !!!! 𝑏. If we reorganize and simplify the resulting equation, we will end up with the original equation 
for the gain function specified in supra note 48 as follows: 𝐺 𝑥 = 1 − 𝑝 𝑏 − 𝐶 𝑥 + 𝑝 𝑏  𝑥 −!!!! 𝑏 1 − 𝐹 𝑥 − 𝐶 𝑥 = 𝑏𝐹 𝑥 − 𝐶(𝑥). 
189. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 292-93 (assuming that the standard 
multiplier is the inverse of the probability of punishment, which reflects both detection and legal 
uncertainty). Gary Becker’s foundational work appears to take the same view. See Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 174 (1968) (defining p as the 
probability of conviction, not just detection). 
190. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 292 n.18, 296 n.23. 
191. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 139, 143-44 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
192. Recall that when uncertainty relates to detection, the multiplier is !!!! . Because 𝑝 is the probability that a penalty will be imposed (bad outcome) while 𝐹 𝑥  is a probability that a 
penalty will not be imposed (good outcome), we need to substitute (1 − 𝐹 𝑥)  for 𝑝 in the multiplier 
formula when we turn from detection to legal uncertainty. Thus, the multiplier needed to offset legal 
uncertainty is !!(!!!)!!! = !!!!. Ignoring detection uncertainty to simplify the exposition, and adding a 
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bad result (detection) is assured; the legal uncertainty-based multiplier makes a 
private actor feel like a bad result (finding of violation) is assured. Thus, an 
uncertain legal standard combined with a multiplier-based penalty aimed at 
offsetting legal uncertainty would amount to a complete prohibition. No 
rational lawmaker interested in compliance would approve such a regime. After 
all, if the policymaker wanted to enact an outright prohibition, it would have 
done so without bothering with devising a vague standard. 
Thus, legal and detection uncertainty have different normative 
significance in this Article’s compliance-focused framework. Legal uncertainty 
is a design feature; detection uncertainty is a problem to be rectified. Whatever 
one thinks about using multipliers in order to offset imperfect detection, those 
reasons are inapplicable when we think about responding to uncertain, non-
optimal laws. 
It is worth noting that, when the proposed model incorporates detection 
uncertainty, it becomes inconsistent with real-life observations. In tax, for 
instance, the probability of detection (whether actual or perceived) is 
significantly below 10% for many transactions and positions subject to 
uncertain legal standards.193 The theoretical multiplier-based penalties for these 
kinds of detection probabilities are very high. The actual civil tax penalties are 
dramatically lower than the multiplier-based ones.194 Moreover, one can take a 
very weak yet plausible position (very low but positive value of x) and escape 
the specter of criminal sanctions altogether.195 If we assume that jail time, no 
matter how unlikely, is an enormous penalty that taxpayers want to avoid at all 
costs, the model predicts that they would take positions that will assure their 
freedom from criminal sanctions and nothing more. Yet numerous taxpayers, 
including highly sophisticated ones, choose to take much less aggressive 
positions regarding items that are very unlikely to be scrutinized by the IRS.196 
The model offered here cannot explain this behavior. In fairness, the 
standard economic analysis of compliance in the absence of legal uncertainty is 
not only equally incapable of providing the explanation, but it does not even 
recognize the problem of failing to deal with ambiguous legal standards.197 
Thus, even this model’s shortfall is the flip side of its conceptual advances. 
 
penalty to the basic legal uncertainty model, with the penalty imposed in cases where the agent loses the 
benefit (with probability (1 − 𝐹 𝑥)  turns the original gain function specified in supra note 48 into 𝐺 𝑥 = 𝑏𝐹 𝑥 − 𝐶(𝑥) − ! !!!! ! 𝑏(1 − 𝐹 𝑥) = −𝐶(𝑥). 
193. See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice To Target 
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 701-02 (2009) (summarizing the literature on the actual and 
perceived probability of detection by the IRS). 
194. See id. 
195. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 58, ¶ 114.9.1 n.28. 
196. As many tax practitioners would attest, the taxpayer’s goal is often to avoid all 
penalties, not just criminal ones. 
197. The familiar puzzle from that analysis is why taxpayers comply rather than 
evade. This puzzle reflects the binary decision facing taxpayers in standard enforcement models that do 
not recognize legal uncertainty. 
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III. Expanding the Model 
Every model has limitations, and the one presented here is no exception. 
This model relies on four main assumptions: a fixed benefit, a single-peak 
distribution as a reflection of an uncertain legal command, a smoothly 
increasing cost of compliance, and risk-neutral actors. These assumptions 
appear reasonable in many settings. Yet each may be questioned. Relaxing any 
of the assumptions makes the model more realistic and broadly applicable. But 
as this Part demonstrates, relaxing some of the assumptions dramatically 
complicates the model, making it difficult to identify even the basic 
relationships. 
A. Complicating the Benefits 
The vignettes used to motivate the basic model introduced in Part I are 
realistic, yet they do not capture many real-life scenarios. To start, each 
vignette reflects the assumption that the actor’s benefit is fixed. This need not 
be the case. The benefit may vary in many ways. Most importantly for the 
purposes of the model, the benefit may vary with x. 
Consider again the corporate law vignette involving the board of directors 
deciding how many costly fairness opinions to obtain in order to defend a 
transaction in court. The vignette posited that getting fairness opinions is 
costly, but this cost has nothing to do with the benefit from the potential 
corporate transaction. There are enough friendly bankers, the vignette 
suggested, to render as many board-friendly opinions as the board is willing to 
pay for. But it may well be the case that the more opinions the board solicits, 
the greater the chance that an opinion will conclude that the transaction is not 
fair at the price preferred by the board. So not only does getting more opinions 
lead to higher overall fees paid to the bankers, it also raises the possibility that 
the $100 million benefit will decline. In these and many other cases, a greater 
compliance effort x yields both a greater cost and a smaller benefit. In terms of 
the model, the benefit is no longer a constant, b. Rather, it is a function B(x). 
Relaxing the fixed benefit assumption makes the model even more similar 
to C&C’s and Shavell’s specifications. As discussed throughout, C&C’s 
simulations produce results that are similar to those generated by the basic 
model offered here, especially if we disregard the results arising from the 
implausible levels of uncertainty. Thus, extending the model to include variable 
benefits is unlikely to undermine the Article’s key findings.198 
 
198. An interesting special case of a variable benefit function is a benefit that is 
proportional (directly or inversely) to x. This specification describes all sorts of valuation problems—an 
important subset of choices under uncertainty in several areas of the law. A detailed analysis of 
uncertain valuations is beyond this Article’s scope. 
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B. Complicating the Costs 
The basic model assumes not only that the cost of compliance increases 
with x, but also that it does so gradually.199 While this assumption is standard in 
economic models, many realistic cost functions are not gradual. 
Consider, again, a company about to engage in a tax-free sale and facing 
the “substantially all” test. Recall that the lawyers advise the company that the 
most likely meaning of “substantially all” is somewhere around 60%. It is quite 
plausible that the company would want to sell half (or some other fraction) of 
its assets in any case—but not more than that. So when the company is 
considering how much costly compliance to undertake, the company’s cost is 
zero for x between 0 and 0.5, and is positive after that. In other words, the cost 
curve may have a kink at 0.5, and it may even have a notch—a jump from zero 
to a value meaningfully different from zero—at this point.200 
Things may be even more complicated. Perhaps the company faces some 
non-tax regulatory hurdles if the percentage of assets transferred exceeds a 
particular threshold. This introduces another kink (or notch) in the cost 
function. Many similar scenarios may be easily envisioned for other vignettes 
introduced at the beginning of the Article. More generally, cost functions may 
not be smooth, and may have all sorts of discontinuities. 
This would present problems for the analysis. If the cost function has 
kinks and notches, it is impossible to solve the model algebraically. 
Simulations become more difficult as well, and highly sensitive to the location 
and the magnitude of notches and kinks. All of this weakens the model’s 
predictive power. Recall, for instance, that the model predicts that rational 
actors would rarely take positions that have less than a fifty-fifty chance of 
being upheld on review. Kinks and notches may cause a privately optimal 
compliance effort to be smaller than xp. In fact, to the extent that rational actors 
are observed taking aggressive uncertain positions that are more likely to be 
wrong than right, a plausible explanation consistent with the model is that these 
actors have non-gradual cost functions. 
C. Complicating the Actor’s Position 
The actor’s compliance effort in the basic model reflects a variation along 
a single dimension. The x-axis reflects a percentage, a time period, a quantity, 
or some other number. This assumption reflects plenty of real-life legal 
standards, but certainly not all. The law is full of multi-factor tests. In tax, for 
instance, a legal expert needs to balance as many as ten or more different 
 
199. More precisely, the model assumes that the cost of compliance is differentiable. 
200. This, for example, will be the case whenever the compliance effort gives rise to a 
fixed cost. A notch is a jump in a function, while a kink is a sharp turn. See Joel Slemrod, Buenas 
Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System Design, 11 J. TAX RES. 259, 259 (2013). 
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factors to decide whether a security is debt or equity,201 whether a worker is an 
employee or a contractor,202 and so on. Can a single dimension (x) represent 
such multi-factor analysis? 
It can. To see how, imagine a two-factor test. For instance, assume that 
whether a security is debt or equity for tax purposes depends on its maturity 
and subordination. Because interest on debt is deductible but dividends on 
stock are not, a corporate issuer would prefer a debt characterization. However, 
the issuer would also prefer a longer maturity and deeper subordination as a 
matter of economics, and both features make security more equity-like.203 Thus, 
shortening the term of the security and increasing its seniority is costly, but also 
makes the debt characterization more likely. 
How would an issuer choose the best maturity-seniority combination? It 
would start by ascertaining the cost of each combination. It would then arrange 
these combinations in order of increasing costs (with more than one 
combination possibly producing the same cost). Finally, the issuer would 
evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoff along the lines suggested by this Article’s 
model. Importantly, the vector of increasingly costly maturity-seniority 
combinations is the present model’s x-axis. 
Needless to say, this exercise becomes exceedingly complicated when the 
number of factors increases. But greater complexity only means that real-life 
decision-makers do not engage in this exercise with a great degree of precision. 
At the same time, there is no doubt that these decision-makers and their legal 
advisors do evaluate the very tradeoffs exemplified in the two-factor example 
every time they make decisions in the presence of an uncertain multi-factor 
test. Thus, accounting for more complex positions does not undermine the 
present model. 
D. Incorporating Risk Preferences 
Finally, the model assumes risk-neutral actors. This assumption is not 
always plausible. Introducing risk preferences raises several difficult questions. 
First, moving along the x-axis changes both the expected value and the 
degree of risk incurred by the private actor. The standard way of investigating 
such compound changes is to disaggregate them into a riskless variation of the 
expected value and a series of zero-sum risky bets.204 Up to this point, the 
model focused only on the first element of this combination—the expected 
value variation—because risk-neutral actors have no preferences over different 
 
201. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 58, ¶ 91.10.2. 
202. See id. ¶ 111.5.2. 
203. For a discussion of these factors, among many others, see I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 
1994-1 C.B. 357. 
204. See LOUIS EECKHOUDT ET AL., ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS UNDER 
RISK 7 (2005). 
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zero-sum bets. Once risk-averse actors enter the picture, we must address the 
second element. 
Doing so presents a challenge. The basic approach to modeling the cost of 
risk is the so-called mean-variance model. 205 That model is based on an 
approximation that establishes a proportional relationship between the cost of 
risk measured by the risk premium and the dispersion of risky payoffs.206 That 
approximation, however, is accurate only for small risks or in special cases 
where the entire distribution may be fully described by its mean and 
variance.207 More generally, risk premium depends on the properties of a 
probability distribution other than its mean and variance,208 and, relatedly, on 
higher order derivatives of the actor’s utility function.209 Recent experimental 
research suggests that utility functions traditionally used to model risk aversion 
may fail to reflect people’s higher-order risk preferences.210 None of this work 
has been applied to the analysis of legal uncertainty as far as I know. 
Second, the uncertainty just discussed relates solely to the chance of 
losing the benefit. However, many uncertain rules are also risk-based.211 For 
example, a rule may require the taxpayer to retain an uncertain amount of 
unwanted risk of loss. In contrast with the risk discussed in the previous 
paragraph, the risk resulting from risk-based rules increases monotonically 
(though not necessarily linearly) with x. The model’s cost function C(x) already 
reflects this kind of cost. However, when C(x) is understood as arising from the 
risk imposed by risk-based rules (rather than fees paid to bankers or expenses 
of selling assets) it may be possible to reflect some of the standard assumptions 
about risk tolerance—such as the constant relative risk aversion—in the 
expected utility calculations.212 
Finally, the probability of success that lawyers convey to a client for a 
particular value of x is itself uncertain. This is the so-called ambiguity—lack of 
clarity about the probability that a particular event will occur.213 Importantly, 
the extent of ambiguity surrounding uncertain legal commands varies with x. 
For values of x corresponding to very small and very large values of F(x) the 
 
205. See id. 
206. This is called the Arrow-Pratt approximation. See id. at 11. 
207 . Examples of such distributions include normal, lognormal, and gamma 
distributions. 
208. More precisely, the premium depends on all four central moments of a 
distribution. See EECKHOUDT ET AL., supra note 204, at 12. 
209. See Cary Deck & Harris Schlesinger, Exploring Higher Order Risk Effects, 77 
REV. ECON. STUD. 1403, 1404 n.2 (2010). 
210. See id. at 1416. 
211. See Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1181 (2008); Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 
TAX L. REV. 643 (1995). 
212. For a discussion of constant relative risk aversion utility functions, see, for 
example, EECKHOUDT ET AL., supra note 204, at 67. 
213. See Talley, supra note 85, at 763-65. When the probability judgment is 
subjectivist, ambiguity refers to the confidence in one’s subjective judgment about a future event. 
05.RASKOLNIKOV.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/17  3:17 PM 
Probabilistic Compliance 
151 
ambiguity is small; otherwise it may be considerable. For example, when a 
lawyer advises a client that there is a 95% chance of obtaining a benefit, the 
lawyer is likely to be fairly confident in the 95% level. If nothing else, this 
number has a clear and not-too-distant upper bound. In contrast, when a lawyer 
states that obtaining a benefit is a 50-50 bet, the lawyer may admit that his 
confidence in the 50-50 number is not that high, so the bet may be 40-60 or 60-
40. Needless to say, a client may view such ambiguity as an additional cost. 
In sum, introducing risk- and ambiguity-related preferences into the model 
complicates the analysis considerably, but promises novel and interesting 
insights. Research into these topics has barely begun.214 
IV. Probabilistic Compliance and the Complete Deterrence Theory 
Until now, we have contrasted the probabilistic compliance approach 
offered here to the theory of optimal deterrence. Although this theory is indeed 
the dominant economic approach for evaluating legal regimes, it is not the only 
one. 
The alternative approach developed by legal economists is that of 
complete (or absolute) deterrence.215  While optimal deterrence focuses on 
maximizing efficiency, complete deterrence aims to ensure compliance. 
Optimal deterrence generally achieves its goals by forcing actors to internalize 
the external harms of their acts.216 Complete deterrence aims to deny violators 
all gains from their violations.217 
The complete deterrence theory is not a legal economist’s first choice. Its 
normative appeal is weak—why insist on enforcing bad laws? Its gain-based 
sanctions may lead to large social losses if courts make even small mistakes in 
assessing the offender’s gain—a deficiency that the optimal deterrence 
approach does not share.218 
The appeal of the complete deterrence theory is practical, not theoretical. 
In contrast with the optimal deterrence theory, the complete deterrence theory 
does not rely on an unrealistic assumption of efficiency-maximizing rules. 
Moreover, numerous statutory sanctions in criminal law, securities regulation, 
antitrust law, and tax law, to take some examples, explicitly aim at denying the 
 
214. See Joshua Teitelbaum, A Unilateral Accident Model with Ambiguity, 36 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 431 (2007); Luigi A. Franzoni, Optimal Liability Design Under Risk and Ambiguity 
(Quaderni—Working Paper DSE No. 1048, 2016). 
215. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 
87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (using the “complete deterrence” term); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal 
Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 513, 552 (1989) (using the “absolute deterrence” term); Raskolnikov, supra note 184, at 218-19. 
216. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 408. 
217. See Hylton, supra note 215, at 421. 
218. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the 
Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 432 (1994). 
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offenders gains from their violations.219 These gain-based sanctions strongly 
link the complete deterrence theory to real-life regulatory regimes. 
Despite this appealing connection, the complete deterrence theory has had 
a decidedly limited reach. Perhaps in response to the doubts about the theory’s 
normative foundations, its proponents usually limit their analyses to acts that 
may not plausibly be viewed as socially desirable. Violent crime, tax evasion, 
and egregious harms deserving punitive damages are the typical examples.220 
Not surprisingly, the complete deterrence literature has ignored legal 
uncertainty. If the goal is to deter an activity completely, any uncertainty that 
potentially permits the activity is undesirable.221 
Yet plenty of legal uncertainty exists in regulatory regimes that rely on 
gain-based sanctions and do not address egregious, reprehensible, violent acts. 
For instance, while criminal tax evasion is subject to gain-based fines, so are 
the tax positions that are possibly legal but ultimately found to be incorrect.222 
Gain-based sanctions also apply to civil securities law violations,223  civil 
environmental violations,224 and many other transgressions that by no means 
arise from activities that should be obviously deterred altogether. Do gain-
based sanctions make sense for these less-than-absolutely undesirable 
activities? What incentives do these sanctions create when they enforce 
uncertain laws? Most generally, what can the economic analysis tell us about 
gain-based sanctions if we abandon the all-or-nothing complete deterrence 
objective and admit the reality of legal standards that are both uncertain and 
non-optimal? 
As is probably obvious by now, these are the questions that this Article 
begins to answer. Recall that the bulk of the discussion assumes that the only 
consequence of the actor’s noncompliance is losing the benefit. This is 
precisely what a gain-based sanction is. Thus, this Article extends the economic 
 
219. For example, the penalty for insider trading is based on “the profit gained or loss 
avoided,” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2012), the Criminal Fines Improvement Act penalizes many white-
collar crimes by fines that are “not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss” 
captured or caused by the offender, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), and the accuracy-related tax penalties are 
based on the amount of tax underpayment, I.R.C. § 6662(a). 
220. See Hylton, supra note 215, at 422; David Markell, Is There a Possible Role for 
Regulatory Enforcement in the Effort To Value, Protect, and Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 549, 566 n.76 (2007). 
221. This discussion does not refer to the literature exploring how gain-based 
sanctions may support optimal deterrence. That literature shares the objective of welfare maximization 
and sometimes expressly assumes that the law is optimal. For recent examples, see Robert Cooter & 
Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 256 (2015); Bert I. Huang, 
The Equipoise Effect, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1600 (2016). In contrast, the present inquiry and the 
complete deterrence theory abandon both the objective and the assumption described above. 
222. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (imposing a penalty on undisclosed positions lacking 
“substantial authority” and disclosed positions lacking “reasonable basis”). 
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (providing civil penalties for insider trading); 15 U.S.C. 
§78p(b) (providing civil penalties for short-swing profits). 
224. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Civil Penalty Policy, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 28-33 (June 2003), http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/resource-
conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-civil-penalty-policy. 
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analysis of gain-based sanctions to settings where law is uncertain and where 
complete deterrence is neither plausible nor desirable. Perhaps, we should start 
referring to gain-based (rather than complete) deterrence, and investigate its 
implications for a much broader range of violations than the complete 
deterrence theory has studied thus far. The probabilistic compliance perspective 
offered here would allow us to do just that. 
Conclusion 
This Article investigates a familiar model of legal uncertainty from a new 
perspective. It does so by shifting the focus from deterrence to compliance, 
from the actor’s choice of effort to the probability of success of the actor’s 
position. This shift yields new insights. It also necessitates an inquiry into the 
meaning of compliance when the law is uncertain. 
The Article’s main takeaways may be summarized as follows. First, the 
famously ambiguous relationship between legal uncertainty and deterrence 
does not extend to the relationship between legal uncertainty and compliance. 
Rather, greater certainty mostly leads to greater compliance. Second, greater 
certainty likely leads to higher private gains. Third, the market for legal advice 
tends to increase the perceived certainty of the law and make uncertain 
standards appear more permissive. Both effects induce less compliant, more 
aggressive positions and increase the number of actors choosing to take them. 
Fourth, the standard penalty multiplier offsets detection uncertainty whether or 
not legal uncertainty is present. However, incorporating the multiplier into the 
model reveals why it should not be used to offset legal uncertainty. 
The Article evaluates these findings from the perspective of a regulator 
who recognizes that compliance is probabilistic, prefers more compliance to 
less, but does not demand perfection. Even this loosely specified regulatory 
objective is inconsistent with some common government enforcement 
strategies in view of the model’s results. Regulators should rethink their 
reliance on the in terrorem effect of vague standards when the actions of 
regulated parties are observable. Regulators should also be wary of leaving 
uncertain laws on the books without either clarifying them or reiterating their 
uncertainty. 
Finally, the Article offers a path to a significant extension of the complete 
deterrence framework that has long played a second fiddle to the dominant 
optimal deterrence theory. The framework’s distinctive feature is gain-based 
sanctions—the same sanctions that are built into the present model. However, 
in contrast with the complete deterrence framework, the probabilistic 
compliance approach extends the analysis of these sanctions to settings where 
the law is uncertain, and where complete deterrence is not appropriate or 
achievable. Granted, even with this extension, the probabilistic compliance 
framework does not offer a strong normative justification of gain-based 
sanctions. But understanding their incentive effects in the presence of legal 
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uncertainty should be quite useful to regulators grappling with the day-to-day 
realities of enforcing countless existing laws, uncertain and imperfect as they 
may be. 
